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6Introduction
“Globalization is an idea whose time has come.” So begins a recent, definitive 
volume about our increasingly globalized world (Held, et. al 1999: 1). Yet, as the authors 
correctly point out, globalization is a concept that lacks clear definition, and there is 
considerable debate about its analytical utility for understanding contemporary international 
relations. While globalization seeks to capture the sense that the world is shrinking, that 
political and other changes in one country can directly affect those in another, there is little 
understanding of its exact contours or impact on particular societies. What is globalization? 
Is it an entirely new phenomenon or is it historically contingent? How does globalization 
differ according to national contexts? What is its impact on society?
This paper will answer the last of these questions by comparing globalization’s 
effects in two particular countries: Poland and Russia. Following the collapse of communism 
from 1989 to 1991, there was an extensive international effort to reintegrate Poland and 
Russia (and the whole of the former Soviet Union more generally) into the global system. 
Now, more than ten years later, there is some doubt about the success of this mission. 
Clearly, Poland and Russia are in different positions vis à vis the international system. While 
Poland is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has just joined 
the European Union (EU), Russia continues to struggle to find its place globally. It is a part 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and has observer status in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), but remains outside NATO and is conflicted about its 
7relationship with its neighbors. The two countries in certain respects, then, represent the 
extremes on a scale of post-communist global reintegration.
There are also considerable differences concerning globalization within the two 
countries as well as between them. For example, while entrepreneurs in Poland see 
connections with Western organizations as the key to foreign investment and improved 
business services, Polish workers worry that products from Spain or the Netherlands will 
undermine their job security. Each group’s beliefs, in turn, colored their responses to the 
question of European integration this past year. To understand globalization in Poland and 
Russia, therefore, requires close examination of its micro-level effects (on specific social 
groups, sectors and individuals) as well as general, macro-level trends.
Accordingly, one broad social class in Poland and Russia — blue -collar workers —
will be considered in this study. As Ost and Crowley point out, to focus on labor issues is 
generally not a popular choice in academic literature — especially not when it concerns 
Eastern Europe: 
With the downfall of regimes that claimed to rule on behalf of the working 
class, attention has turned to traditional political science concerns such as 
party formation or economic issues like privatization. When social 
scientists look at civil society, they tend to look at NGOs, or new forms of 
protest, or the emergence of the new elite. It is indicative of our times that 
so much has been written about new elite formation and so little about 
working-class formation (Crowley and Ost, 2001: 4).
Nonetheless, there are several reasons why labor in Poland and Russia deserves scrutiny. To 
begin with, “labor has been central to the fate of advanced capitalist democracies. This is 
especially true of Western Europe, to which the post-communist countries so ardently aspire” 
(Crowley and Ost, 2001: 4). Labor’s importance to democratization on the European 
continent stems from the historical role that trade unions have played in articulating and 
8structuring workers’ grievances. Indeed, trade unions have been “essential to democratic 
stability because they channel the inchoate social anger that comes from being a subordinate 
into a formal economic grievance capable of being redressed” (Crowley and Ost, 2001: 4).
At the same time, the fact that this Western European model of “labor relations and 
class compromise is itself being transformed just as Eastern European countries are 
attempting to adopt it” presents post-communist workers with a unique challenge (Crowley 
and Ost, 2001: 4). If labor’s response is weak it may have profound “political implications, 
for it means that the anger that trade unions have traditionally funneled into class cleavages 
can get diverted into nationalist, fundamentalist, and other illiberal directions. If this is so, … 
labor weakness may threaten [the consolidation of liberal, capitalist democracy in Eastern 
Europe]” (Crowley and Ost, 2001: 5) 1. 
Thus, focusing on labor within the context of Poland and Russia’s drive to reintegrate 
into the global system has important consequences much beyond the immediate. 
Conventional wisdom about globalization in the two countries, in turn, seems to indicate that 
its impact has been extremely negative for workers. Is this the case? Ultimately, the work 
ahead will answer two overarching questions: What does Poland and Russia’s reintegration 
into the globalized system look like overall, and is conventional wisdom about its specific 
impact on blue-collar workers in the two countries accurate?
The Plan Ahead
Chapter I presents the analytical framework upon which this study of globalization in 
Poland and Russia is based. The chapter defines the meaning of globalization, its historical 
1
 See Chapter III for a discussion of labor weakness.
9antecedents, and several of its possible impacts. It also explores some of the reasons why 
globalization is so controversial. The chapter closes with a broad overview of structural 
similarities in Poland and Russia’s experience with globalization after 1989 and 1991.
Chapter II, the background-historical chapter looks at what life was like for workers 
in Poland and Russia in the period just prior to the collapse of communism. While 
globalization affected Poland and Russia before 1989 and 1991, the years truly marked a sea 
change in terms of the two country’s interaction with the outside world. As such, the chapter 
begins with a discussion of the extent of this interaction, followed by a specific examination 
of workers’ relationship to the state during communism.
Chapter III, the political chapter, examines the impact of globalization on the 
relationship between workers and their respective (state and regional) governments. 
Globalization’s impact is mediated both by a particular country’s overall positioning in the 
global system and by the internal dynamics of state-civil society relations. Therefore, this 
chapter seeks to determine the exact nature of these two currents — or in other words, it asks: 
how has globalization changed the relationship between blue-collar workers on the one hand 
and the state in Poland and Russia on the other? Ultimately, it points to the fact that 
globalization has been as much a political ideology as a social phenomenon in Eastern 
Europe.
Chapter IV discusses how globalization has altered Polish and Russian blue-collar 
workers’ economic opportunities and job security. It focuses particularly on the extent to 
which transnational corporations (TNCs) and foreign ownership have been responsible for 
employment and production changes within certain sectors and individual firms in each 
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country. In some respects, it is in this sphere of economics that globalization has had the 
most significant and divergent consequences.
Chapter V investigates the social impact of globalization on workers in Poland and 
Russia. As in the sphere of economics, the social consequences of globalization for workers 
in the two countries have been particularly acute and diverse. The chapter specifically 
explores the development of social policy in both countries after communism’s collapse as 
well as the efforts (or lack thereof) to build a comprehensive social safety net for the workers 
hardest hit by globalization.
Finally, Chapter VI makes conclusions about the impact of globalization in Poland 
and Russia and some general propositions about the future for blue-collar workers. It is 
important to note that in all chapters there will be an effort to distinguish between regions
within the two countries. Just as globalization is mediated by the state in various ways, its 
reach is equally affected by regional disparities. A worker in Moscow, for example, may 
experience an extensity and intensity of globalization that is markedly different from a 
worker in Novosibirsk; the same holds true for a farmer from Katowice and one from 
Gdansk. 
In addition to these differences, there are also significant divergences according to the 
sector and even the specific occupation from which an individual comes. Russian 
steelworkers’ interactions with global forces are not identical to those of workers in the oil 
industry; nor do low skilled workers have the same options or challenges as highly skilled 
industrial workers. Throughout the chapters, then, regional, sectoral and occupational 




What is Globalization? 
Globalization is a concept that is highly contested. Thomas Friedman defines it as the 
“inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never 
witnessed before – in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to 
reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before” (Friedman 2001: 
302). For some, globalization signifies the decline of the nation-state and the ascendancy of 
the market in the organization of human affairs (Held, et al. 1999: 3 and Lechner and Boli, 
2000: 1-3). Still others see globalization as the:
Closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has 
been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation 
and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the 
flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge and people across borders 
(Stiglitz 2002: 9).
Moody judges that globalization is not a “fact of life” but a process, and that the deepening of 
(capitalist) economic integration has had disastrous effects in certain parts of the world 
(Moody 1997: 42). Indeed, these effects have been so disruptive they have provoked a 
worldwide resistance movement against a seemingly uncontrollable “globalization from 
above” (Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000: X and Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 14-16). For a 
minority, the entire concept of globalization is exaggerated. They believe that globalization is 
not historically unprecedented, and that what the world is seeing today is in reality a 
heightened level of interaction between national economies (Held, et. al 1999: 5).
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All of these definitions partly capture the essence of globalization. Globalization 
certainly is characterized by the closer integration of national market economies and is, 
without a doubt, redefining traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and autonomy. 
Economic globalization has also produced significant negative side effects. Globalization is 
in part a product of the declining cost of communication and transportation technologies, and 
it certainly has historical antecedents.
The problem with most of these characterizations, however, is that they tend to focus 
on only one aspect of globalization (economic, cultural, etc.) or they paint globalization in 
either/or terms. Globalization either is a new phenomenon or a continuation of a long-term 
historical process. It is either strengthening the state or leading to its obsolesce. Globalization 
is either “good” or it is “bad.” None of these propositions are entirely satisfactory in defining 
globalization because they fail to recognize that globalization can be all of these elements at 
the same time.
Accordingly, the definition of globalization that will be used in this study is an 
amalgamation of all of the above-mentioned descriptions. As Held et al, indicate, 
globalization is:
A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the 
spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in 
terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, 
interaction, and the exercise of power (Held, et. al 1999: 16).
This concept of globalization is the most accurate for it incorporates not only economic 
forms of globalization but political, social and cultural as well, thereby capturing all of the 
various elements that the above-mentioned scholars highlighted.
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Expanding upon this definition, Held, et. al explain that extensity is a “stretching of 
social, political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and 
activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and 
communities in distant regions of the globe” (Held, et al 1999: 15). Intensity signifies a 
growing regularization of connections across societies, which in turn implies a “speeding up 
of global interactions and processes as the development of worldwide systems of transport 
and communication increases the potential velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, goods, 
information, capital and people” (Held, et al 1999: 15). Finally, growing extensity, intensity 
and velocity of global interactions leads to a “deepening enmeshment of the local and the 
global such that the impact of distant events is magnified while even the most local 
developments may come to have enormous global consequences. In this sense, the 
boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs may be blurred” (Held, et. al 1999: 
15).
This comprehensive definition widens the scale and scope of globalization such that it 
includes most of the worldwide processes seen today. Put another way, this explanation of 
globalization does not limit the concept to describing single developments like 
regionalization, the growth of free market capitalism or the decline of the importance of the 
nation-state. The flexibility built into the definition allows it to include processes that might 
seem on the surface to be contradictory. For example, it can show that globalization is on the 
one hand leading to a decline of the traditional concept of the nation-state, but on the other 
providing new opportunities for the exercise of state power. This definition, then, is as 
encompassing as possible.
A History, or What is Distinctive About Globalization Today?
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To appreciate what is distinctive about globalization today requires first an 
understanding of the kind of international systems that preceded it. Globalization is by no 
means an entirely new phenomenon, but certain of its features in the contemporary period 
are novel. The mid 1800s to the late 1920s, for example, could qualify as another era of 
globalization. During this time, Great Britain was the dominant global power and invested 
heavily in other markets, individuals in England and the United States were affected by 
financial and other crises in Argentina and Latvia, and the invention of the steamship, the 
telegraph and the telephone all served to magnify the extensity, velocity and impact of these 
crises (Friedman 2001: 299).
As Thomas Friedman notes, however, what is new about globalization today is the 
“degree and intensity with which the world is being tied together into a single globalized 
world … What is also new is the sheer number of people and countries able to partake of this 
process and be affected by it” (Friedman 2001: 298). These differences are clearer when one 
compares certain forms that globalization has taken throughout history in the spheres of 
migratory, cultural, political, economic, and labor activity. In all of these areas, globalization 
has had a long history, but its particular manifestation today is unique and unprecedented 
(Held et. al 2001: 136).
Globalization and Migration
The interaction between globalization and the migration of peoples from one part of 
the world to another has an extensive history. From the sixteenth century onwards European 
elites traveled and conquered the Americas, Africa and Asia, while between 1880 and World 
War I, Europe’s poor fled in massive numbers to the United States seeking economic 
security. During World War I, international migration fell as worldwide political and 
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economic conditions worsened, but the political realities of World War II saw huge increases 
in forced refugee migrations from Europe, the Soviet Union and North Korea to Israel, the 
United States and South Korea respectively. In the 1950s and 1960s, millions of people went 
to Europe to take advantage of its booming economies, and in the 1970s, the demand for 
cheap labor continued to drive migration from Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Held, et. al 
2001: 136).
As Held et. al indicate, this long history of global migration has presented the 
contemporary world with an unprecedented degree and intensity of ethnic, religious and 
cultural diversity:
There is more ethnic diversity than ever before in states of the 
Organization for Economic and Community Development (OECD) … and 
the United States is experiencing levels of migration that are comparable 
to … the late nineteenth century … There has also been an astronomical 
rise in asylum seeking, displaced persons, and refugees from wars as states 
are created and collapse in the developing world (Held, et. al 2001: 137).
These developments have forced all governments — local, state and national — to re-
examine questions of national citizenship, employment, cultural identity and global control 
of migration. The globalization of migration thus has fundamentally altered the organization 
of societies worldwide.
Cultural Globalization
The globalization of culture also has a long history. The great pre-modern empires 
held themselves together through a common ruling class culture rather than through direct 
military or political control, and even with the rise of the nation-state and nationalism in the 
eighteenth century, technological advances in transport and communications helped these 
Western empires’ ideas to spread and transform societies in other parts of the world (Held, et. 
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al 2001: 138). What is different about the contemporary period is once again the sheer “scale, 
intensity, speed and volume of global cultural communications today” (Held, et. al 2001: 
137). As Stiglitz indicated earlier, the rapid diffusion of this new technology, coupled with its 
declining cost, has removed whatever barriers to communication existed. This, in turn, has 
dramatically redefined the political authority of the state, for it has made national controls 
over the flow of information increasingly ineffective.
Today’s form of cultural globalization is also distinctive because it is “driven by 
companies not countries. Corporations have replaced states and theocracies as the central 
producers and distributors of cultural globalization” (Held, et. al 2001: 139). This has 
increased the spread of cultures as well as its impact. Though some argue that this corporate-
led spread of cultural values is synonymous with Americanization, Westernization or 
“McDonaldization,” in reality cultural globalization has led to two competing forces: “the 
growth of multicultural politics almost everywhere and, in part as a reaction to this, the 
assertion of fundamentalist identities (religious, nationalist and ethnic)” (Held, et. al 2001: 
138).
This is transforming the organization of state power to such an extent that it is now a 
threat to those countries that pursue policies closed to new information and culture. For 
example, “China sought to restrict access to the Internet but found this extremely difficult to 
achieve” (Held, et. al 2001: 138). Globalization, at least in terms of its cultural aspect then, is 
both redefining traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and introducing new forms and 
locales of cultural power and authority (Held, et. al 1999: 85).
Political Globalization
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In order to understand what is distinctive about politics in the contemporary era of 
globalization, one must first grasp how political society was organized in the past. Central to 
the previous international system was the Westphalian notion of the nation-state. That is, 
modern states were:
Nation-states – political apparatuses distinct from both ruler and ruled, 
with supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a 
claim to a monopoly of coercive power, and enjoying legitimacy as a 
result of a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens (Held, 
et. al 1999: 45).
This type of political organization was marked further by a clear separation between the 
domestic and foreign spheres of state activity — “the ‘inner world’ of territorially bounded 
national politics and the ‘outer world’ of diplomatic, military and security affairs” (Held, et. 
al 1999: 32).
The organization of international affairs in today’s era of globalization is significantly 
different from its Westphalian predecessor because this clear, exclusive link between 
geography and political power no longer exists. To begin with, the locus of political power is 
no longer solely national governments. Political authority is now shared by a multitude of 
national, regional and international organizations, and layers of governance have spread 
within and across traditional nation-state boundaries (Held, et. al 1999: 80 and Held, et. al 
2001: 139). It also cannot be assumed that political identity follows the contours of 
traditional nation-state boundaries. As Held, et. al note, “the system of national political 
communities persists, but it is articulated and rearticulated today with complex economic, 
organizational, administrative, legal and cultural processes and structures which limit and 
check its efficacy (Held, et. al 1999: 81).
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Another distinctive feature of political globalization today is that while it has not 
wholly undermined the traditional concept of state sovereignty, it has changed the notion that 
sovereignty is an “illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form of public power” (Held, et. al 
1999: 81). Indeed, the interaction of individual states in new and complex regional or global 
systems like the European Union or the World Trade Organization has affected their 
autonomy — “by altering the costs and benefits of policies and influencing institutional 
agendas” and their sovereignty — “by changing the balance between national, regional and 
international legal frameworks and administrative practices.” Traditional state power has 
now become embedded in and fractured by other domains of political authority (Held, et. al 
1999: 81).
The distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is also no longer applicable in 
this era of globalization. With governments facing problems like AIDS, the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and global climate change that spread across national boundaries, these 
categories are not sufficient to describe the organization of and responses to international 
affairs. Today, “political space for the development and pursuit of effective government and 
the accountability of power is no longer coterminous with a delimited political territory. 
Contemporary forms of political globalization involve a deterritorialization of political 
authority … and intensive transboundary coordination and regulation” (Held, et. al 1999: 81).
A final, unique feature of politics in the contemporary period of globalization has 
been the strengthening and broadening of international law. As Held, et. al highlight, a 
framework of “cosmopolitan law — governing war, crimes against humanity, environmental 
issues and human rights” — has emerged today which is making fundamental “inroads” into 
state sovereignty (Held, et. al 2001: 139). These new human rights laws in turn are lobbied 
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for and monitored by an increasing number of international organizations (e.g. Amnesty 
International or the International Criminal Court), which transcend traditional nation-state 
lines.
Ultimately, globalization has fundamentally transformed conventional political 
organization by:
Reconstituting traditional forms of sovereign statehood and reordering 
international political relations … as a result, the contemporary world is 
best understood as a highly complex, contested and interconnected order 
in which the interstate system is increasingly embedded within evolving 
regional and global political networks. The latter are the basis in and 
through which political authority and mechanisms of governance are being 
articulated and rearticulated … [all of the above-mentioned] developments 
illuminate a shift away from a purely state-centric politics to a new more 
complex form of multilayered global governance (Held, et. al 1999: 85).
This shift towards a more multi-layered global governance has meant in practice (as it did for 
cultural globalization) that traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, while not superfluous, 
are now acting in concert with a host of other forms of political power and authority.
Economic Globalization
As should be clear from the above-mentioned definitions of globalization, when most 
people think of globalization they think of its economic aspects. This stems in part from the 
sheer scale of global economic relations today, but also from the perceived effects of the 
global economy on certain countries and particular social groups within them. Once again, 
global trade, production and finance have all existed for centuries, but what is distinctive 
about such economic networks during this period of globalization is that they are both greater 
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than ever before and “linking national economies together at a deeper level than in the past” 
(Held, et. al 2001: 142). 2
To begin with, just as the division between international and domestic politics has 
become blurred in the face of contemporary globalization, so too has the division between 
international and domestic economic activity. Countries not only consume larger quantities 
of goods from abroad, but production processes are increasingly outsourced overseas – which 
has led to the emergence of a new “global division of labor and new patterns of wealth and 
inequality” (Held, et. al 2001: 142-143).
The globalization of the economy has also fostered an increase in transnational 
corporations (TNCs). These TNCs have not only transnationalized their own production 
processes, but have also pushed smaller, national firms into transnational production chains. 
This widespread economic transnationalization, in turn, has forced state governments to learn 
how to balance “domestic priorities and conditions with the demands of global capital” 
(Held, et. al 2001, 144). This is manifest in the increasing pressure (led by international 
organizations like the WTO, IMF and World Bank) on countries to harmonize their corporate 
practices, taxes, business regimes and macroeconomic policies with those of accepted 
international standards.
Alongside these TNCs, most countries are also integrated into global financial 
markets, which in various ways constrain individual states’ role in determining the nature of 
their country’s national economy (for example, it limits states’ ability to determine long-term 
interest and exchange rates). It is important to note, however, that this “does not mean that 
the financial markets simply determine national economic policy. But they do radically alter 
2
 As a caveat, however, it is necessary to point out that while these linkages are occurring they are only doing so 
in certain places. The development of economic connections, then, is a combined and uneven phenomenon.
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both the costs of particular policy options and policymakers’ perceptions of costs and risk” 
(Held, et. al 2001: 144). It is also significant that individual country’s access to these 
financial and other markets is highly uneven. Therefore, the impact of the global economy on 
individual countries and individual social groups within them is far from uniform.
Globalization and Labor
Finally, globalization has also had distinctive consequences for labor relations and the 
nature of work. On the optimistic side:
Globalization has led to, or at least accompanied, a certain degree of 
decentralization of production and work methods. Politically it has tended 
to “hollow out” the national state and, perhaps, made it more porous 
regarding social initiatives. At the cultural level it is now accepted that 
globalization [and particularly the information technology revolution] has 
… provided workers and unions with instant information from around the 
world. It is not just that the information has become more accessible; it is 
also that there is more transparency, monitoring and control of what is 
happening around the globe than ever before. The [technology revolution] 
can be seen to create to some extent … a new democratic equivalent, 
allowing for better international communications, technically, socially and 
politically (Munck, 2002: 63-64).
Less positively, however, the relationship between labor and globalization is often viewed as 
one in which workers are passive victims of new globalizing trends, the “malleable material 
from which globalization construct its new world order” (Munck, 2002: 67). Capital is seen 
as an “active, mobile, forward-looking player in the globalization game while labor is seen as 
static, passive and basically reactive. The game has changed and labor is seen to have few 
cards” (Munck, 2002: 68).
Globalization has negatively affected workers in three principle ways: It has led to an 
increased “flexibilization” of the work force, to its feminization and to a belief that trade 
unions are no longer necessary; that they are archaic. The debate about the flexibilization of 
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labor has centered on whether it encourages economic growth (which helps to create jobs) or 
not. According to Munck, flexibility can take five main forms: external numerical flexibility 
(number of employees adjusted in accordance with employers’ needs), externalization (the 
part of a firm’s work which is put out through subcontracting), internal numerical flexibility 
(working hours adjusted according to employers’ needs), functional flexibility (workers’ jobs 
modified according to employers’ needs) and wages flexibility (according to workers’ 
productivity and market conditions) (Munck, 2002: 72).
This drive towards labor flexibility, which is a global one, “albeit taking different 
forms given the particular national forms of embeddedness of the labor market” is 
unfortunately in practice “spelling smaller work forces, fewer rules in the workplace, weaker 
unions and wages being tied to the business cycle” (Munck, 2002: 73). Though labor 
flexibility, if agreed to with workers and their unions’ input, can lead to more constructive 
working conditions, the dominant  global approach to it has been one in which workers’ 
needs are subordinated to those of capital  – “that is, national economies are following routes 
that are directly and explicitly against labor” (Munck, 2002: 73). This has ultimately led to a 
more precarious employment situation for workers and a decline in productivity. A better 
approach to labor flexibility would acknowledge the importance of economic growth, but 
also focus on: 
better levels of education and training for workers. Above all, it would 
develop new forms of regulation as required by the new internationalized 
production systems and the more flexible labor markets that have 
developed. Effective production restructuring and innovative forms of 
competitive advantage have usually emerged in situations where trade 
unions are strong and labor is treated as a human resource and not just 
another cost to be cut (Munck, 2002: 74).
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Related to the flexiblization debate has been the feminization of the global labor 
force, which could “potentially have the most far-reaching social consequences” for workers 
(Munck, 2002: 74). Deregulation, the retreat of the state from economic affairs and flexibility 
have all led to a shift in the gender patterns of employment such that the number of women in 
paid formal employment has increased dramatically (Fairbrother and Griffin, 2002: 9-11). 
Yet, this trend is not unproblematic. As Munck indicates, “the gender division of labor, 
which tends to confine women to relatively subordinate and inferior positions in the 
organization of monetized production, is not overridden by flexiblization” (Munck, 2002: 
75).
This feminization of the global labor force also highlights the “problems with 
traditional trade union notions centered around the male worker in a factory and the family 
wage” (Munck, 2002: 75). One positive response to these changes has been that linkages 
between factory workers, “stay-at-home” women’s campaigning groups and women’s groups 
are now being pursued at the international level in many developing countries (Munck, 2002: 
75).
The discourse of a “new, globalized economy” which dominated the economic mood
in the 1990s also negatively affected the global work force in that:
Poor economic performance in the West, particularly in Western Europe, 
was blamed on labor’s rigidity in terms of wages, labor conditions and 
constraints on capital imposed by trade unions. Flexibility became 
synonymous with dynamic change, and an ability to adapt to pressures and 
incentives … What the much-vaunted strategy actually entailed was a 
reduction in wages (numerical flexibility), and an increase in the number 
of tasks the remaining workers had to perform (functional flexibility). 
Overall, the flexibility offensive had created by the end of the 1990s a 
work force which was much more insecure and had seen many of the 
welfare rights [of workers] wiped away (Munck, 2002: 78).
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These attitudes encouraged efforts on the part of national governments, industries and 
individual firms to actively inhibit the development of trade unions, workers’ councils or 
codified labor standards concerning working conditions and productivity (Newland, 2001: 
307-308). At the same time, however, it is important to note that these trends are highly 
differentiated and uneven. There are “tendencies towards financial autonomy, flexibility and 
a reduction in labor standards. Yet there are also elements pulling in the opposite direction” 
(Munck, 2002: 81).
In the end, then, globalization today is a combination of the old and the new. It is old 
in the sense that certain forms of it have existed for centuries. It is new in terms of its scale 
and scope, as well as in its range of actors and those affected by it. In redefining traditional 
conceptions of state power, cultural identity, economic autonomy and labor relations, 
globalization today is challenging states and individuals to “reform [their] existing 
territorially defined democratic institutions and practices so that politics can continue to 
address human aspirations and needs … globalization is reilluminating and reinvigorating the 
contemporary political terrain” (Held, et. al 2001: 146). The goal of the future, if possible, 
will be to determine how traditional conceptions of state organization and international 
affairs can be reformulated in a world in which such traditional conceptions are increasingly 
blurred.
Globalization’s Impacts
If globalization is marked by a reorganization of social relations and transactions, 
how does this transformation affect individual members or groups within a society? As Held, 
et. al observe, analyzing globalization’s impact is difficult to determine, but “without some 
clear understanding of the nature of impact, the notion of globalization would remain 
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imprecise …” (Held et. al, 1999: 17). Therefore, the authors have outlined four distinct types 
of impacts, which will serve to inform the analytical backbone of this study. These are 
decisional, institutional, distributive and structural. Decisional impacts refer to “the degree to 
which the relative costs and benefits of the policy choices confronting governments, 
corporations, collectivities and households are influenced by global forces and conditions” 
(Held, et. al, 1999, 18). Thus, globalization can increase or decrease the cost of various 
policy options, thereby altering an individual or state’s decision-making tools. Decisional 
impacts can be assessed in terms of “high impact (where globalization fundamentally alters 
policy preferences by transforming the costs and benefits of different courses of action) and 
low impact (where policy preferences are only marginally affected)” (Held, et. al, 1999, 18).
However, the impact of globalization may not always be best understood in terms of 
decisions taken or foregone:.
since it may operate less transparently by reconfiguring the agenda of 
decision-making itself, and consequently, the available choices which 
agents may or may not realistically make. In other words, globalization 
may be associated with … the ‘mobilization of bias’ in so far as the 
agenda and choices, which governments, households and corporations 
confront, are set by global conditions. Thus, while the notion of decisional 
impacts focuses attention on how globalization directly influences the 
preferences and choices of decision-makers, the notion of institutional 
impact highlights the ways in which organizational and collective agendas 
reflect the effective choices or range of choices available as a result of 
globalization (Held, et. al, 1999: 18).
Whereas decisional impacts have a direct bearing on societies, then, institutional impacts are 
more indirect, changing the context in which societies have to function rather than altering 
their form or mode of operation (Held, et. al, 1999: 19).
Globalization can also have significant distributional impacts, altering the allocation 
of power and wealth both between and within societies. Globalization changes the 
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configuration of social forces in a society (classes, groups, etc.) such that, for example, “trade 
may undermine the prosperity of some workers while enhancing that of others. In this 
context, some groups and societies may be more vulnerable to globalization than others” 
(Held, et. al, 1999: 18). 
Finally, globalization can have considerable structural impacts in so far as it 
conditions and changes the patterns of domestic social, economic and political organization 
and behavior within a particular society (Held, et. al: 1999: 18). “Accordingly, globalization 
may be inscribed within the institutions and everyday functioning of societies” (Held, et. al, 
1999: 18). For example:
The spread of Western conceptions of the modern state and capitalist 
markets have conditioned the development of the majority of societies and 
civilizations across the globe. They have forced or stimulated the 
adaptation of traditional patterns of power and authority, generating new 
forms of rule and resource allocation (Held, et. al, 1999: 18).
These structural consequences of globalization impacts can be visible over the short and the 
long term in the “ways in which states and societies accommodate themselves to global 
forces” (Held, et. al, 1999: 18).
Ultimately, globalization can transform the organization, distribution and exercise of 
power in societies. Varying degrees of control of, access to and enmeshment in global 
networks has significant consequences for the “life-chances and well-being of peoples, 
classes, ethnic groupings and the sexes” (Held, et. al, 1999: 20). This study will examine 
these impacts specifically with respect to the two above-mentioned social groups and 
highlight how they are indicative of Poland and Russia’s reintegration into the globalized 
world in general.
Why Globalization is so Controversial: A Response to Its Impacts
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In his seminal work, Globalization and Its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz asks a 
fundamental question:
Why has globalization — a force that has brought so much good —
become so controversial? Opening up to international trade has helped 
many countries grow far more quickly than they would otherwise have 
done … globalization has reduced the sense of isolation felt in much of the 
developing world and has given many people in developing countries 
access to knowledge well beyond the reach of even the wealthiest in any 
country a century ago … foreign aid, another aspect of the globalized 
world, for all its faults still has brought benefits to millions, often in ways 
that have almost gone unnoticed (Stiglitz, 2002: 4 – 5).
According to Stiglitz, the fundamental reason for such controversy stems once again from the 
tendency to view globalization, especially its impacts on individual societies, in terms that 
are too black and white. To its proponents, globalization, or more specifically economic 
globalization in the form of Western-style capitalism, is progress — “developing countries 
must accept it, if they are to grow and to fight poverty effectively” (Stiglitz, 2002: 5). 
Globalization’s opponents, by contrast, tend to ignore the above-mentioned positives and 
vilify globalization. To them, globalization has not brought any of its promised benefits. 
Moreover, its obvious negatives are overlooked by globalization’s proponents (Stiglitz, 2002: 
5).
In reality, globalization has produced both positive and negative results, though they 
have been highly uneven and concentrated among certain countries and regions. Some 
scholars argue that in the Third World globalization has increased the divide between the 
haves and the have-nots to such an extent that the number of people living in poverty has 
actually increased — by almost 100 million since the close of the twentieth century (Stiglitz, 
2002: 5 and Tabb, 2002: 121-128). Globalization has also not succeeded in ensuring stability 
in certain countries. “Crises in Asia and Latin America have threatened the economies and 
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the stability of all developing countries … globalization and the introduction of a market 
economy has also not produced the promised results in Russia and most of the other 
economies making the transition from communism to the market ” — instead of 
unprecedented prosperity, it has brought unprecedented poverty (Stiglitz, 2002: 6).
Western countries, by contrast, have enjoyed the bulk of the benefits from 
globalization. As Stiglitz notes, this stems from the fact that it is Western countries that are 
driving the globalization agenda, “ensuring that it garners a disproportionate share of the 
benefits, at the expense of the developing world” (Stiglitz, 2002: 6). This can be seen with 
respect to trade agreements between Western and developing countries. While Western 
countries have pushed poor and transitioning countries to eliminate trade barriers and 
subsidies, they have “kept up their own barriers, preventing developing countries from 
exporting their agricultural products and so depriving them of desperately needed export 
income” (Stiglitz, 2002: 6-7). Indeed, the net effect of these terms of trade has been to “lower 
the prices some of the poorest countries in the world receive relative to what they pay for 
their imports. The result is that some of the poorest countries in the world have actually been 
made worse off [by economic globalization]” (Stiglitz, 2002: 7).
Ultimately, the benefits of globalization have been so concentrated among a relative 
few that the price paid by the majority has been significant:
The environment has been destroyed, political processes have been 
corrupted and the rapid pace of change has not allowed countries time for 
cultural [and other] adaptation. The crises that have brought in their wake 
massive unemployment have, in turn, been followed by longer-term 
problems of social dissolution — from urban violence in Latin America to 
ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world, such as Indonesia (Stiglitz, 
2002: 9).
Globalization in Poland and Russia
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Stiglitz’s claim that Western countries are driving the globalization agenda has 
particular significance when discussing overall structural similarities between Poland and 
Russia’s experience with globalization. As de Boer-Ashworth indicates, Central and Eastern 
Europe’s reintegration into the globalized system has rested on its relationship with certain 
Western and international financial institutions after 1991 (e.g. the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the European Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development). This has had profound consequences for Poland and Russia’s transition into 
the globalized world (Bjorkman, 2003: 1 and Millar and Wegren, 2003: xvii-xxvii).
In order for the post-Soviet countries to succeed in their transitions from communism 
and a state-owned economy to democracy and the free market, they needed investment 
capital and other support from these above-mentioned institutions (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 
55-56). These major institutions, in turn, had a general agreement about how to approach the 
new situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Initially caught off-guard by communism’s 
collapse, they subsequently maintained that these countries follow a rigid program of neo-
liberal reform. In spite of the fact that the communist experience in Central and Eastern 
Europe had unique features (namely the state’s all-encompassing involvement in politics, 
society and the economy), this “Washington Consensus” was based on the IMF’s and other 
institutions’ experiences in Latin America, where neo-liberal policies appeared to have 
successfully brought the countries there into the democratic and free-market fold (de Boer-
Ashworth, 2000: 56 and Ottaway and Carothers, 2000: 3-16).
Such a neo-liberal approach to globalization has very distinct implications for 
societies once it is adopted, however. In general, “neo-liberalism builds on the convictions of 
classical liberalism that market forces will bring prosperity, liberty, democracy and peace to 
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the whole of mankind” (Scholte, 2000: 34). Thus, in the eyes of neo-liberals, the state should 
not interfere in any way with market forces. There should be minimal official regulation, 
state-imposed limitations on the movement of money, goods, capital and services should be 
abolished and state controls on prices, wages and foreign exchange rates should be removed. 
There also should be minimal state ownership of productive assets and considerable 
reductions in the state provision of welfare guarantees (Scholte, 2000: 34-35 and Sperling, 
2000: 25-26).
These neo-liberal suppositions were built into the “shock therapy” program that the 
IMF and other institutions – in the form of loan conditions - insisted that Poland and Russia 
implement in the early 1990s. In rapidly adopting a series of macroeconomic stabilization 
policies (price liberalization, elimination of state subsidies and reform of the tax system), 
shock therapy sought to dismantle the administrative-command system of the communist 
economy and replace it with the capitalist market economies associated with Western 
democracies. It was hoped that these policies would control inflation and stabilize the two 
country’s economies, thereby encouraging foreign investment and monetary aid from 
international financial institutions as well as individual investors (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 
58 and Wedel, 1998: 200).
Given the nature of the previous communist system, this neo-liberal approach to 
Poland and Russia’s “leap” into the globalized world (Bednarzik, 1990: 25) represented 
nothing less then a sea change in the organization of social relations within the two countries. 
Shock therapy was a complete reversal of the pre-1989 communist political and economic 
systems, and this had significant consequences for blue-collar workers in both countries. Yet, 
it is important to note that there has been considerable debate as to “how much” shock 
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therapy Poland and Russia actually enacted. Indeed, while the initial debate about shock 
therapy centered around the objectives of the reforms (organizational reform of the central 
planning system, market socialism or a pure market economy?), in the latter part of the 1990s 
it focused largely on assigning blame for shock therapy’s “failure” — which in turn centered 
on questions of pace and methodology (Baylis, 1994: 174-175).
According to Baylis, on these questions “economists frequently were (and are) 
arrayed against politicians” (Baylis, 1994: 175). Economists tended to favor the shock aspect 
of shock therapy, in which fundamental reforms of virtually every aspect of life were 
introduced more or less simultaneously, on the grounds that all are interdependent and the 
(unavoidable) pains of transition are best addressed as quickly as possible (Baylis, 1994: 
175). Politicians, by contrast, tended to be more inclined to urge caution, “often out of fear 
that the severe economic dislocations reform would entail would bring social and political 
turmoil and their own expulsion from office” (Baylis, 1994: 175). The initial model of the 
“proper” implementation of shock therapy reforms, which favored the economists’ approach, 
was the “ ‘leap into the abyss’ program proposed for Poland by the Harvard economist 
Jeffrey Sachs and adopted, under pressures of hyperinflation, by that country in modified 
form” (Baylis, 1994: 183). Russia soon followed suit in the early 1990s.
Explanations for why Poland and Russia (and most of the former Soviet Union) 
“failed” in their efforts at this shock therapy reform have since fallen along two lines. One 
“blames the resistance of the nomenklatura, former Communist (or Communist-appointed) 
officials who stand to lose influence and material benefits if reforms are successfully 
enacted” (Baylis, 1994: 181-182). The second explanation “stresses the partial and 
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inadequate character of the reforms thus far enacted; the only cure for the ills of reform, this 
view insists, is more reform, and in particular more privatization” (Baylis, 1994: 182).
Though it is mainly against Russia that the latter argument has been leveled, it is 
essential to recognize that the Polish, “Balcerowicz reforms were less comprehensive and 
less uncompromising than they were initially advertised as being” (Baylis, 1994: 183). In the 
Russian case, many Western proponents of shock therapy argued that the Russian version of 
the reforms:
were gradually phased out during 1992, or that it was never fully applied 
in its original design. Thus, in one of his postmortems on the failed 
stabilization effort, Jeffrey Sachs provides a list of six basic elements of 
‘genuine shock therapy’ that were missing or belated in the Russian case. 
Some of these pertain to the scale and direction support for currency 
stabilization, budget deficit financing, and debt rescheduling (Reddaway 
and Glinski, 2001: 234).
Ultimately, the success or failure of the shock therapy measures in Poland and Russia 
depended less on the extent or pace of their implementation, but rather on the pre-existing 
performance of economic structures and the overarching communist system which organized 
Polish and Russian society in particular, unique ways. It is to an examination of this 
communist system and the extent to which it allowed for global interconnections that the next 
chapter turns.
Chapter II
Globalization and Workers in Communist Poland and Russia
In order to understand whether and how globalization affected workers in communist 
Poland and Russia, it is first necessary to outline a general picture of the relationship between 
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the former Soviet Union and the international community from 1945 to 1991. While most 
people think that the Soviet Union was completely cut off from the rest of the world after 
World War II, in reality the USSR’s interconnections with the outside, non-communist world 
during this time changed according to the heating up or cooling down of the Cold War. 
Therefore, the beginning of this chapter approaches the question of globalization during 
communism from the macro-level, discussing the contours of East-West relations post-1945. 
The chapter then turns to an examination of globalization at the micro-level, describing the 
relationship between workers and the state in the two countries and to what extent global 
forces shaped this relationship.
The Macro-Level: Globalization during the Cold War
According to Baylis, the policy approaches of the non-communist countries toward 
the Soviet Union after 1945 fell “along a spectrum ranging from accommodation to Soviet 
control … through the gradual transformation of that control into something less all-
embracing and restrictive, to its total dissolution” (Baylis, 1994: 5).
Accomodationists were concerned most of all with maintaining the stability of East-
West relations and as such thought a friendly, peaceful and non-confrontational approach to 
the USSR would more easily permit “political and economic liberalization within [the 
USSR’s] borders” as well as economic and political cooperation between the two halves of 
the world (Baylis, 1994: 5). Dissolutionists, by contrast, favored uncompromising policies 
toward the Soviet Union “in order to raise the ‘costs of empire to the USSR while that 
country simultaneously had to cope with the expensive task of responding to the American 
arms buildup and the uncertain threat of the Strategic Defense Initiative” (Baylis, 1994: 5). 
The transformationist view:
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sought to encourage incremental changes through a combination of carrots 
and sticks that did not frontally challenge Soviet interests or provoke 
uncontrollable turmoil in Eastern Europe. The goal … was to loosen 
Soviet control gradually and expand the autonomy, personal freedom, and 
economic well-being of East-Europeans, while simultaneously reducing 
the hostility between East and West (Baylis, 1994: 5-6).
These overarching policy attitudes shaped Poland and Russia’s links with the outside world 
from 1945 to 1991. The bipolar nature of the international system “colored not only security 
concerns” but economic, political, social and cultural approaches to globalization (de Boer 
Ashworth, 2000: 35).
At the same time, however, while these three policy approaches determined the 
USSR’s overall interaction with the international community, the exact nature of the links 
between individual countries of the Soviet Union and the global political economy changed 
with specific changes in Cold War leaders and policies. Thus, even though the “Cold War 
and the Soviet Union’s largely closed economic system would separate it from the Bretton 
Woods post-war international economic order … and considerably limit the access of its 
countries to the international liberal economic order … the interaction between East and 
West was stronger than one might presume” and the countries of the USSR and Central 
Europe were not entirely isolated from the global political economy (de Boer-Ashworth, 
2000: 31-32). This can be observed most clearly when one compares the extent of Poland’s 
integration into the global political economy from 1945-1991 with that of Russia’s.
Poland
As de Boer-Ashworth indicates, despite the strong influence exerted by the Soviets 
over Central Europe in terms of military matters, “their control over the various economies 
was not strong” (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 40). Immediately after World War II, Poland 
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signed the Bretton Woods agreement and received a $45 million loan from the World Bank 
even though it was now considered a satellite state of the Soviet Union. As Cold War 
tensions heated up in the mid 1950s, however, Poland withdrew its membership from the 
IMF and WB (Bjorkman, 1995: 90). In response, the Truman administration put sharp 
restrictions on trade with communist countries and forced the Western European countries to 
follow suit by implementing a Marshall Plan that required recipients to deny strategic exports 
to the communist European countries (Baylis, 1994: 46-47).
The return of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the leadership of the Polish communist party 
apparatus in October 1956 signaled the beginning of a political, economic and cultural thaw 
in these confrontational policies. Acceptance of Gomulka forced the Soviet leadership de 
facto, “to accept a degree of domestic liberalization unmatched at the time, the abandonment 
of agricultural collectivization, a measure of reconciliation with the Catholic Church, an 
expansion of cultural freedom … and the establishment of workers’ councils” (Baylis, 1994: 
49-50). This liberalization, in turn, opened the door for Poland to pursue closer (economic) 
integration with countries outside the communist bloc. Indeed, the country openly solicited 
economic assistance from the West (in the form of $300 million in credits) in 1957.
The non-communist countries of Europe and the United States responded to this 
opening by loosening restrictions on exports to Poland and in 1960 President Eisenhower 
granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to Poland, “formally determining in the process 
that the country was not Soviet-dominated as understood under the Trade Agreement 
Extension Act” (Baylis, 1994: 50). While the lion’s share of imports and exports from Poland 
still went to the USSR, “at least a third of Polish trade in the pre-1989 era was with the EC 
and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries” (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 40). These 
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changes in the relationship of Poland to the outside world also “implanted in the minds of 
many Western policymakers the understanding that Eastern Europe could no longer be 
viewed as a monolithic bloc dominated and controlled from one country” (Baylis, 1994: 50).
This “differentiated approach” to Poland was strengthened with the further cooling of 
Cold War tensions during détente. Under pressure from business interests concerned over 
their disadvantages in competition with the Western Europeans in Eastern European markets, 
for example, new American legislation “actively urged the expansion of trade with the East 
and sought to limit export controls.” (Baylis, 1994:53). The EC and Japan, in turn, concluded 
a series of comprehensive economic arrangements with Poland and other countries of Central 
Europe, which “included a system of quotas, bilateral agreements and quantitative 
restrictions” (de Boer-Ashworth: 2000, 41).
These new developments in the Western attitude toward Poland “coincided with a 
greatly increased interest on the part of Poland and most of the countries of Central Europe 
and the Soviet Union in importing Western goods and in utilizing Western credits” (Baylis, 
1994: 54). While this did not signal Poland’s willingness to adopt a Western style political 
system, it did show its recognition that foreign capital through trade could increase the 
aggregate wealth of the country (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 40). 
Ultimately, the period of détente saw Poland increasingly linking the fate of its 
economy (and by extension its society) not only with that of individual countries outside the 
communist bloc, but with the larger global political economy in the form of international 
financial arrangements. Indeed, this period was to “mark the beginning of heavy borrowing 
by many of the CEECs” (de Boer-Ashworth: 2000, 41). Despite its centrally-planned state 
and economic apparatus, then, Poland was “effected by and took part in the global economy 
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… and stagnation in the late 1970s and early 1980s was to signal the failure of Poland’s [and 
many other countries of Central Europe and the Soviet Union] attempt modernize without 
significant political/government reforms” (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 41). These unique 
structural problems in turn were exacerbated by the global economic downturn that 
characterized the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The early 1980s saw a modification of these global economic links as the “Reagan 
administration came to power sounding an anti-communist rhetoric unmatched in the 
American executive since the early years of the Cold War” (Baylis, 1994: 56). When Poland 
imposed martial law in December 1981, the administration responded by imposing economic 
sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union. For Poland, this included the termination 
of credits for Polish agricultural exports, the suspension of its MFN status and denial of IMF 
membership for the country (Baylis, 1994: 57). Western Europe gave little support to these 
sanctions, but its relationship with Poland also subsequently cooled as a result (Baylis, 1994: 
58). While the effectiveness of these sanctions can be disputed, the economic hardship they 
brought to Poland played a significant role in the ending of martial law and the granting of 
amnesty to most political prisoners in 1983. These concessions on the part of the Polish 
communist government, in turn, persuaded the administration to lift the sanctions (Baylis, 
1994: 57).
By the end of the Reagan and the start of the Bush administrations, however, “the 
confrontational elements of Western policies toward [Poland and the other countries of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe] disappeared almost entirely under the halo of the 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Agreement and successive Reagan-Gorbachev summit 
meetings” (Baylis, 1994: 58). In 1987, the American government restored MFN status to 
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Poland and “enthusiastic talk of expanded U.S.[and Western more generally] trade with bloc 
countries became respectable inside as well as outside” the USSR (Baylis, 1994: 59).
In the end, as de Boer-Ashworth notes:
although the political tensions between the East-West superpower blocs 
are well-documented, the economic isolation was not as stark as many 
have suggested. For Poland [and the other CEECs] the situation did not fit 
neatly into a textbook description of international relations where 
independent countries relate to each other in an anarchical global system. 
The CEECs were militarily dominated by the Soviet Union … However, 
the CEECs were also being pulled into the Western system of global 
capitalism through their international borrowing and adherence to Western 
models of industrial progress (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 42).
Thus, while Poland’s incorporation into the Soviet bloc did circumscribe its ability to align 
its political and economic structures with those of the global community, it did not do so as 
completely as one might think. Even as its foreign policy and domestic political practices 
continued to be modeled on those in Moscow, Poland’s economic fortunes were increasingly 
determined by the nature of the global political and economic system. Indeed, in terms of 
Held, et. al’s distributional and institutional impacts, Poland’s changing relationship vis à vis 
this international system not only directly altered the costs of certain policy options (as seen 
with respect to martial law) but fundamentally changed the context in which such policy 
options could be carried out.
Russia
Russia’s relationship with the outside world during communism followed essentially 
the same pattern as that of Poland except that the quantitative and qualitative extent of its 
interconnections with the global political and economic system was considerably less given 
that Soviet leadership had much more direct control over the country. As mentioned earlier, 
while initially the international community treated all communist countries in the same 
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manner — restricting imports from and exports to the Soviet Union and eliminating any 
foreign assistance — once Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet Bloc and Gomulka 
assumed leadership in Poland, it began to pursue a differentiated approach to particular 
countries in the communist bloc (Baylis, 1994: 48-49).
Given that Russia was the major representative of the Cold War conflict on the 
Eastern side, this differentiation policy meant in practice that opportunities for the country to 
link up to the globalized system were few. Nonetheless, like Poland, Russia’s need to:
acquire advanced means of production from the West meant that it had to 
export its natural resources in order to finance its essential imports of 
machinery … by the Brezhnev period [when Poland and other countries of 
the bloc were also increasing their links with the West] Russia had become 
dependent on its exports of oil and gas to finance its imports of machinery, 
and even of food, and the reproduction of the Soviet system depended 
increasingly on transactions on the world market [emphasis added] 
(Clarke, 2003: 191-192).
Like Poland, it is important to note that the “opening of the [Russian] economy to the world 
market, and the corresponding political processes of détente, were by no means a sign of 
fundamental change in the [Russian/Soviet] system” (Clarke, 2003: 192). These changes did 
not signal Russia’s willingness to adopt a Western style political system, but rather were the 
“means by which change was constantly postponed” (Clarke, 2003: 192). Once again, 
however, like Poland this isolated focus on economic integration could not last. When the 
terms of trade turned against Russia and its economy stagnated in the 1980s, this signaled the 
failure of the communist countries to modernize without undertaking major political changes. 
Therefore, such governmental reforms could no longer be postponed.
The Micro-Level: Workers in Communist Poland and Russia
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Keeping in mind the macro-level extent of globalization in Poland and Russia from 
1945 to 1991, this chapter will now turn to the unique relationship between workers and the 
state under communism. Once again, to fully appreciate how Poland and Russia’s re-
integration into the globalized world has changed workers’ position in the two countries, an 
examination of their situation prior to the Soviet Union’s collapse is absolutely necessary.
As noted by Derleth, “starting with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia and 
continuing with the liberation and then occupation of the region by the Soviet Army at the 
end of World II,” Poland and Russia, like their Central and Eastern European neighbors, had 
to create matching (or as close to matching as possible) Soviet-style regimes (Derleth, 2000: 
1). While this meant in practice the establishment of an authoritarian political system with 
individual social groups having only “ritual participation in national and local politics” 
(Kramer, 1998: 5), it also implied certain material benefits for workers: “state control over 
most aspects of life provided social mobility, universal education, health care and greatly 
improved living standards” for the great majority of workers. (Derleth, 2000:1). Indeed, by 
the 1980s:
The state-regulated system ensured that virtually all of the Soviet Union’s 
citizens enjoyed a modest standard of living, job security, and price stability. 
Almost everyone had access to free education, health care, relatively early 
retirement, and diverse pensions and social benefits (Silverman and 
Yanowitch, 2000: 22).
In addition to providing these highly regulated social “safety” nets, the state organized 
relations within and between social groups in a very specific way:
 The Communist Party claimed to represent [workers and other social groups] 
universally and to control everything. [Therefore], organizations were either 
brought under Communist Party control or liquidated. Thus, trade unions, 
professional associations and sports clubs … were taken over by the 
Communist Party, while opposing parties were prohibited (Aslund, 2002: 24).
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Such an approach to the organization of society meant for labor in Poland and Russia that 
trade unions, the traditional provider of a collective voice for workers both at the national, 
local and enterprise levels, served merely as “transmission belts” to ensure fulfillment of the 
Polish and Russian state’s political goals (Meier-Dallach and Juchler, 2002: 72). Rather than 
acting as organizations seeking to advance workers’ rights, then, communist-era trade unions 
“worked hand-in-hand with management and dealt with labor grievances purely on an 
individual basis” (Kramer, 1995: 5 – 6). 3
Having acknowledged trade unions’ political collusion with the state, it is nonetheless 
important to note that during communism, blue-collar workers in Poland were “far better 
organized and more politically influential than their counterparts in [Russia and the rest of 
the Soviet Union more generally]. During each of the major political crises in Poland in the 
mid-1950s and the late 1980s … workers played a central role” (Kramer, 1995: 74). 
This central role of Polish workers stemmed from the above-described nature of 
globalization in Poland prior to 1991 (especially the existence of a sizable private sector in 
agriculture, some industry and services in country). As Kramer indicates, Poland’s specific 
relationship with the global political and economic system: 
Placed Polish workers in a somewhat different position from that of workers 
in Russia [and other East-bloc countries], where central planning was more 
firmly entrenched. Some rudimentary features of a free-market economy were 
already present in Poland, and Polish workers had gained valuable experience 
in mobilizing for collective ends. Even in Poland, however, the idiosyncrasies 
of some forty years [of communism] could not help but take their toll 
(Kramer, 1995: 76).
3
 It is important not to overstate the role of trade unions as communist party transmission belts, however. As 
political control in general loosened with the assumption of leadership by Nikita Khrushchev, trade unions were 
able to take on a more active (albeit still more limited than their counterparts in the West) role in representing 
workers’ interests and rights.
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Just as Polish and Russian workers had a distinctive relationship with the state under 
communism, they had an equally characteristic one vis à vis the economy. The economy 
during communism was organized on the basis of central planning, which meant that the 
state apparatus itself determined physical production targets for all major goods and major 
enterprises (Aslund, 2002: 25). This “managed” economy thus had profound consequences 
for workers and the nature of the labor market in both countries prior to 1991. One major 
effect of central planning on the Polish and Russian labor markets, for example, was an 
excessive demand for labor. As Kramer indicates, even though “unemployment in Poland 
[and the other countries of the Soviet Union] was illegal and officially non-existent during 
the communist era, labor hoarding and disguised unemployment were pervasive” (Kramer, 
1995: 76). This excess demand, in turn, led to an extremely low geographic mobility of the 
work force in both countries. It also encouraged low labor efficiency and productivity. 
Ultimately, as Kramer indicates, the communist labor market structure in Poland 
enabled:
Most employees of Poland’s state-owned enterprises to get by with very lax 
work regimes, and many did not bother to show up for work at all, knowing 
that they stood little or no risk of being fired  … the low productivity of Polish 
labor and the disproportionate emphasis that central planners traditionally 
gave to heavy industry, skewed the whole structure of the Polish work force, 
leaving it with greater concentrations of employment in agriculture and 
industry than would be found in an average Western country (Kramer, 1995: 
78).
The same can be said for the labor market in communist Russia. Indeed, the labor market 
structure in Russia was so equally dysfunctional that it led to the now famous Russian adage: 
“They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work” (Christensen, 1999:122).
In addition to this guaranteed job security, many state enterprises, through the main 
communist-era trade unions (OPZZ in Poland and VTsSPS in the Soviet Union), provided 
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“cheap housing, child care, vacation opportunities, inexpensive food, and other subsidies. A 
system of administrative prices made basic necessities such as food, children’s clothing and 
housing, public transportation, and cultural activities affordable” (Silverman and Yanowitch 
2002: 22). These “carrots” effectively tied workers to their enterprises, discouraging them 
from seeking employment elsewhere for fear of losing much-needed social benefits.
Overall, the life of a Polish and Russian worker under communism was one 
characterized by (relative) security. While workers’ political rights were largely 
circumscribed by weak trade unions and an authoritarian system of governance, the welfare 
nature of the state apparatus coupled with the structure of the economy — specifically the 
extent of each country’s links with the global political economy and the structure of the labor 
market — provided workers in both countries with lifetime employment and steady wages 
(for a modicum of actual physical labor). Extensive social safety nets, in turn, ensured 
workers’ acquiescence to the system, and guaranteed that they would be tied not only to their 
particular enterprise for social benefits but also to the larger, national-level government. 
Clearly, then, the fusion of politics, economics and society was as complete as it could be in 
Poland and Russia prior to 1991. The advent of shock therapy and the speeding up of the 
drive to reintegrate the two countries into the global system promised to change this reality.
Chapter III
“We Will Not Catch Up to Europe if We Build a Strong Union”: 
Globalization, Workers and Politics in Post-Communist Poland and Russia
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As mentioned in the theoretical chapter on globalization, institutional impacts 
emphasize the ways in which “organizational and collective agendas reflect the effective 
choices or range of choices available as a result of globalization. Globalization can 
reconfigure the institutional agendas and invite innovation” (Held, et. al, 1999: 18). In the 
sphere of politics, this is exactly the type of impact that globalization has had on workers in 
Poland and Russia. After examining the relationship between workers, trade unions and the 
respective state governments in these two countries, this chapter will demonstrate that 
globalization has directly influenced the political choices that the governments and trade 
unions there made vis à vis workers. Globalization provided not only the political model, but 
also the rhetorical language around which the Polish and Russian governments reorganized 
their relationship with workers after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
At the same time, however, while the models reflected the alternatives available as a 
result of globalization, how they actually played out in practice was shaped by the particular 
confluence of political, economic and social forces in the two countries after 1989 (Poland) 
and 1991 (Russia). Indeed, the way in which the models have manifested themselves in 
Polish and Russian society indicates, to use the words of Clarke and Ashwin, that their 
adoption by the respective governments marked a “break more in the rhetoric than in the 
substance” of worker-state relations (Clarke and Ashwin: 2003, 135). 
In today’s Poland and Russia, then, labor’s political “voice” is extremely weak, which 
stems from the fact that labor has been purposely “created” weak by political leaders in both 
countries (Crowley and Ost, 2003: 228). This move on the part of political leaders, in turn, is 
the result of adopting a model with little understanding of how the particular labor histories 
of both countries would influence it. Therefore, while on the surface the relationship between 
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workers and the state appears to have changed dramatically as a result of globalization, in 
reality workers’ interactions with global forces at the political level remain strongly affected 
by the legacies of the communist past. Workers, in turn, remain politically weak.
Poland
In discussing how globalization affected Polish workers in the political sphere, it is 
necessary to give a brief outline of the trade union models that have developed as part of 
labor movement theory. For, as David Ost convincingly argues, Poland’s adoption of one of 
these models in the late 1980s – a direct result of the country’s drive to reintegrate into the 
global political and economic system - was particularly damaging to Polish workers’ ability 
to effect political change. The decision to take up this model of trade unionism was based on 
a particular ideological understanding of global capitalism that was inappropriate for the 
Polish post-communist context, and as such, it produced an outcome that marginalized labor 
instead of empowering it. It was only after Polish trade unions began to move away from this 
model and toward a strategy that was better informed by Poland’s pre-1989 labor history that 
workers began to rebuild their political voice in the country.
In response to global trends of declining trade union influence and membership, two 
models of trade unionism have recently been proposed by labor theorists as the key to 
revitalizing labor. The first involves a “new organizing model” – that is, it entails finding 
innovative ways to recruit new members. The second, known as social movement unionism 
(SMU), involves working with “allies outside the workplace and making unionism part of a 
broader struggle for social justice … both are subsets of the more general tendency of 
political unionism” (Ost, 2002: 33). More specifically, the argument of the organizing model 
is that unions today can only succeed when they conduct an “aggressive grassroots rank-and-
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file strategy focused on building a union and acting like a union from the very beginning … 
unions today, the argument goes, must work with members, not just for them” (Ost, 2002: 
39).
Such an organizing model present problems when applied to the post-1989 Polish 
context, however  because of the way in which workers and trade unions interacted prior to 
communism’s collapse:
[Workers’] prior experience was of de facto obligatory union membership, 
[thus] even union officials felt that freedom from trade unions constituted 
an important working class victory [after 1989]. Rank-and-file workers, of 
course, felt this even more. This did not mean that personal contact had no 
place at all … but the point is that the success of an organizing model 
depends on the nature of prior experiences. Aggressive organizing may 
work when employees feel they have been ignored by unions. But when 
employees have a history of feeling overly patronized by unions, it makes 
little sense that organizing will seem secondary to servicing (Ost, 2002: 
38).
The social movement unionism model is equally problematic because it involves 
“going beyond the factory gates with demands that include broad social and economic 
change … the emphasis is on broad public involvement for radical social change” (Ost, 2002: 
40). This type of model assumes that unionists are committed to advancing the interests of 
workers, but this is not the case in Poland (or in Eastern Europe more generally) because 
“many unionists became involved in unions [during communism] only because they were 
interested in broader social issues” (Ost, 2002: 40). Moreover, “SMU theorists want strikes 
over factory issues to slide seamlessly into struggles over larger community issues, but in 
Eastern Europe what appeared to be strikes over factory issues turned out [after 
communism’s collapse] to be strikes only over larger community issues, such as freedom of 
speech and association …” (Ost, 2002: 41).
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The problem with both of these models of trade unionism, then, is that they are based 
on previous experiences in (mostly) Western countries, which are inappropriate for Poland 
and Eastern Europe more generally given their communist past. As should be clear from the 
preceding chapter, “unions in communist society were something quite different from [those 
in the West] and thus the unions that are evolving out of that society need to be understood in 
that context instead” (Ost, 2002: 41).
In particular, Communist-era trade unions were “servicing machines par excellence,” 
and this became one of the oppositionists’ prime targets in the late 1980s because “even 
where it worked well, it was intrinsically connected to paternalist authoritarianism, 
inseparably linked with political repression” (Ost, 2002: 42). In addition, the leaders of 
communist-era trade unions never saw:
their unions as defending workers in particular against any other organized 
social interests, except that of the Communist Party. The realities of 
capitalist class society seemed too far in the distance for these unions to 
contemplate seriously, and the realities of communist society were that it 
was hard to separate workers’ interests from the interests of other social 
groups … not only did everyone objectively become a member of the 
working class … but anyone could claim subjective membership as well 
(Ost, 2002: 42-43).
This has meant that the trade unions that emerged from the post-communist societies of 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s saw themselves as representatives of 
universal interests, not of particular labor interests. As such, they represented a “communist-
structured working class very different from and larger than the one that emerges in capitalist 
society” (Ost, 2002: 43).
In spite of these unique features, however, when communism collapsed in Poland 
there was a singular focus on the social movement model of trade unionism. Certainly, this 
concentration on SMU had some recent, historical antecedents (namely, the immense reach 
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and popularity of Solidarity), but it stemmed mainly from Polish political leaders’ 
(mis)understanding of the role that labor, and its political representatives, trade unions should 
play in a democratic, market-oriented society. Solidarity leaders had looked at their pre-1989 
movement as one devoted to toppling communism (Meardi, 2000: 101 and Osa, 2003: 166-
168). Now, post-1989, they viewed it as explicitly about building a neo-liberal capitalist 
order, as this was the prevailing international model (Terry, 2000: 7-10). In practice, this 
meant for Solidarity’s leaders an increasingly less significant role for workers because 
workers had been the ideological foundation of the previous political system. It is important 
to note, however, that the trade unions truly believed that “creating this type of a capitalist 
system was in the interests of workers” (Ost, 2002: 45).
When Solidarity came to power in late 1989, therefore, it advised against the 
formation of strong trade unions: “we will not catch up to Europe if we build a strong union”, 
Solidarity leader Lech Wałsa told a union executive committee in September 1989 (Ost, 
2002: 45). To underscore their commitment to this vision of labor relations, Solidarity and 
other labor leaders definitively turned away from the servicing model of trade unionism they 
associated with the communist past. Instead, based on their above-mentioned understanding 
of what constituted a “proper” capitalist society and on the advice of international trade union 
activists and the ILO, the Solidarity leadership set out to implement an SMU model of trade 
unionism (Ost, 2002: 45).
The decision to adopt this particular, globally accepted political model of trade 
unionism had almost immediate and significant consequences for workers. Solidarity 
leadership proceeded to endorse a shock therapy and privatization bill that limited union 
influence at the workplace and told workers and their trade unions that the “main aim of 
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unions today was to help employees get accustomed to the new economic relations” 
(Kulpinska, 2004: 10). As Ost indicates:
when government policies aimed explicitly at empowering a capitalist 
class and weakening the privileges of labor made [a servicing model of 
trade unionism] necessary, such an evolution was blocked – not only by 
the institutional pattern that had already been set, but also by the neo-
liberal predilections of the union’s leaders (Ost, 2002: 46).
Ultimately, the Solidarity leadership (as well as many Polish intellectuals) saw “unions as not 
only no longer necessary for fighting communism, but as inappropriate to capitalism. Their 
flagship journal, Gazeta Wyborcza … regularly presented unions as institutions of the past 
capable only of jeopardizing reform” (Ost, 2001: 83). Instead of being servicing agencies 
“par excellence,” then,  trade unions were now expected to pursue a purist form of free-
market ideology “that had little to do with the realities of the Europe they hoped to join” 
(Ost, 2001: 83).
Servicing also declined at the workplace. Solidarity’s regional unions abandoned 
and/or discarded enterprise assets such as housing, vacation homes and spas, opposed the old 
payments-in-kind for simple retail distribution and discouraged addressing workers’ 
grievances “in line with its emphasis on expert authority and its deep-seated belief that a 
workforce long disciplined (loosely) by communism needed to be profoundly shaken up” 
(Ost, 2002: 46). Local activists, for their part, were also reluctant to provide services (except 
to monitor lay-off procedures), and saw employee participation in enterprise governance as 
contrary to the principles of the market economy that they were trying to implement. Despite 
a long Polish tradition of strong employee councils elected by the workforce, only one-fifth 
to one-third of local union officials believed that some form of employee councils should 
continue to exist at the workplace (Ost, 2002: 46-49).
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It is important to note that there are other reasons for trade union weakness in Poland. 
To begin with, trade unions have become weak and fragmented in the post-1989 environment 
because the “chief political grievance of the past forty years, which had so often spilled over 
into … widespread labor unrest, [is] no longer present after 1989. More than anything else, 
Poland’s subordination to the Soviet Union … denied any hint of legitimacy to the Polish 
communist regime” (Kramer, 1995: 107). The consensus that resulted (around the need to 
abandon communism) strengthened the Polish government’s mandate. Thus, it was initially 
able to implement the above-mentioned changes with little dissent from workers or any other 
social group.
In addition to widespread support for moving away from communism, the 
“fragmentation of the Polish labor force and of the post-communist trade unions [has] 
forestalled the emergence of a cohesive, nationwide workers’ movement akin to the 
Solidarity movement of 1980-1981” (Kramer, 1995: 108). Though, as mentioned, servicing 
has declined at the enterprise-level, the reformed version of the old communist-era trade 
union (OPZZ) does maintain at least a minimal level of property and social security 
distribution functions there and this has allowed it to:
Take up much of the ‘institutional space’ for unionization. Workers stay on 
the membership roles and tolerate the union because they need the benefits its 
functionaries dole out, but union leaders enjoy very little authority or loyalty 
among the rank-and-file (Cook, 1995: 116).
Solidarity and other independent trade unions formed after communism’s collapse 
have also failed to adequately address workers’ needs in the post-1989 Poland. As Cook 
notes, independent unions have been hurt by their association with the reformist government, 
which workers see as the bearer of their economic and social problems 4. This “inevitably has 
4
 See Chapters IV and V
51
produced conflicts between their politics and their role in defending workers … emergent 
independents also suffer from basic organizing problems: inexperienced leadership and few 
resources … as a consequence, most independent trade unions remain very small, localized 
and nearly powerless” (Cook, 1995: 16-17). Polish trade unions, therefore, have proved 
unsuccessful at providing workers with a real political voice since 1989. This fact has only 
compounded the economic and social fall-out from the transition to the global system5.
What has been the end result of this reorganization of labor relations in Poland? - A 
massive decline in union membership and a general political crisis for Polish workers. 
Gardawski finds that there are barely “any trade unions in new private firms, that they are 
undergoing steady erosion in transitional firms and that only in obsolescent state firms are 
they holding their own. Union membership has remained strong in the public sector … while 
in the productive new sectors of the economy, unions barely exist at all” (Gardawski, 1999: 
65-66). Ultimately, “the reformed Polish economy is becoming a non-unionized economy” 
(Ost, 2002: 46).
As Ost notes, however, not all scholars agree that Poland’s focus on neo-liberalism 
and the SMU trade union model has been so politically damaging for labor. Some have 
argued that unions have been able to use their political access to moderate the impact of 
shock therapy, while others claim that Solidarity’s political impact led to a less corrupt 
privatization process. A few even argue that Solidarity’s parliamentary representation 
allowed it to have greater input in the shaping of labor legislation (Ost, 2002: 47). Yet, the 
problem with this view is that:
it takes union weakness for granted, and posits a priori the inevitability of 
anti-labor policies … if official policy is to cut labor influence in society 
and economy, then of course it is better to have political allies than not. 
5
 See Chapters IV and V
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However, if we allow that such policies were not the only ones possible, 
then the fact that they were adopted without protest is itself a sign of union 
weakness. Political unionism has been devastating because it has 
prevented labor from even forcing a discussion of alternative policies (Ost, 
2002: 47).
It seems that Polish trade unions are slowly starting to realize just how distressing 
their political SMU policy has been for labor. This awareness has been prompted primarily 
by widespread worker dissatisfaction with the government. In 2001, Polish trade unions 
began the largest union organizing drive of the post-communist era, focusing on the private 
enterprises that they had neglected in the past (Ost, 2002: 49). Perhaps most importantly, in 
May 2001, the Solidarity National Committee decided to withdraw from the governing SEA 
coalition – “with this one step, the union cutting its formal institutional link to the ruling 
government party” (Ost, 2002: 48). What followed has been a new focus on what trade 
unions can do for labor rather than with them. It has been, in other words, a new focus on 
“servicing” (Ost, 2002: 49).
In the end, the Polish case illustrates that the reason why labor is weak in the country, 
at least in the political sphere, stems primarily from the ideological hegemony of neo-
liberalism. 6 In other words, Polish leaders’ singular focus on building a “neo-liberal 
capitalist order,” which was a direct result of their interactions with and understanding of 
global political norms, structured labor’s participation (or, more correctly, non-participation) 
in the political sphere such that workers emerged (or were “created”) weak.
At the same time, however, one must recognize that while globalization provided a 
particular model of trade unionism, how the model played out in practice was shaped by the 
specific past communist experience and ideological characteristics of the Polish context. As 
should now be clear, Polish labor was skeptical about unions from its experiences with 
6
 This will be explained in the next chapter.
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communism. Therefore, “the new elites [in Poland and Eastern Europe more generally] led 
the struggle against communism with conceptual narratives that identified communism’s 
exaltation of the working class as part of the problem that needed to be redressed. [When 
communism collapsed] many Solidarity unions then accepted the prevailing neo-liberal 
discourse that marginalized labor” (Ost and Crowley, 2001: 229).
Thus, global ideological factors explain the political weakness of workers in Poland. 
The current rejuvenation of unionism, in turn, has been possible only because of an 
understanding of the importance of these factors. As Ost indicates: 
[the Polish experience] suggests that it is the abandonment of servicing 
and the embrace of social movement unionism that has driven members 
away. What successful unions are beginning to do differently today is to 
make clear that they seek to represent labor’s interests in capitalist society, 
not lead to a social movement fighting a former kind of society (Ost, 2002: 
50).
Russia
As in Poland, globalization directly influenced the political choices that the Russian 
government made regarding workers in the country. Also as in Poland, in practice those 
particular choices were shaped by the interaction between the country’s communist legacy 
and the global ideological domination of certain models of political organization (for society 
in general and workers in particular).
According to Clarke and Ashwin, one of the defining characteristics of the post-
communist Russian labor movement “has been its adherence to ‘social partnership’” (Ashwin 
and Clarke, 2003: 132). At the national level, this commitment to sotsial’noe partnerstvo
manifested itself in the form of the Tripartite Commission for the Regulation of Social and 
Labor Relations (RTK). Anxious to make his reform program appear democratic to the 
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Western governments from which he expected political and monetary support, former 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin instituted the RTK in late 1991. The commission was 
supposed to serve as a forum for negotiation between representatives of labor (i.e. trade 
unions), government and management, and each year it was expected to negotiate a “General 
Agreement” on issues like income, employment and labor standards, as well as help to 
resolve labor disputes if they arose (Christensen, 1999: 122).
The 1990 Founding Congress of the FNPR, emphasized further this commitment to 
social partnership when it adopted a resolution defining the basic tactics of trade unions as:
Involving the negotiation of general, tariff and collective agreements, to be 
backed up by demonstrations, meetings and strikes … this is an extensive 
program for the formation of social partnership as a particular type of 
social-labor relations, an effective mechanism of civilized regulation of 
those relations (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 132).
What is significant about Russia’s orientation toward social partnership for this study 
is from where the idea originated. As noted by Ashwin and Clarke, the doctrine of social 
dialogue has “long been a staple of the International Labor Organization (ILO)”, and the ILO 
has been assisting Russia (and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) in transforming 
its labor relations along a more Western basis since the early 1990s (Ashwin and Clarke, 
2003: 132). While the FNPR officially downplays the role of these outside forces and instead 
argues that the notion of social partnership has a long history in Russian labor relations, 7
individual Russian trade union activists say otherwise. Vladimir Kiselev, the head of the 
department of social partnership and the trade union movement at the FNPR’s Academy of 
Labor in Moscow, “argues strongly that social partnership did not exist in the past since the 
7
 Official FNPR documents claim that “in conditions of centralized administration of the economy with only 
state property, social partnership between enterprise administrations and different forms of worker participation 
in the administration of production existed in the USSR” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 133).
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leading role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union meant that equality of rights 
(ravnopravie) between the parties was impossible” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 133).
Similarly, Galina Strela, the head of the department of social-labor relations and 
defense of workers’ economic rights at the FNPR states that:
First of all, I must say we came up with practically nothing new in the 
theory of social partnership. In principle we adhere to the ideology, which 
has been developed by the International Labor Organization. In our 
country, of course, in our past practice there were several differences –
although there were agreements, collective agreements were concluded, 
the practice was different. Why? Because all labor relations were 
regulated by law. Strict legal regulation (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 134).
Therefore, while elements of social partnership may have existed in Russia prior to the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, sotsial’noe partnerstvo represented a qualitatively new idea 
after 1991. As will become clear, it was an idea based at least in theory on true equality of 
rights as well as negotiation and compromise between the state, employers and trade unions.
Having acknowledged the influence of the ILO, then, what do “Russian trade unions 
mean by social partnership and how does it differ from their past relationship with the Party-
state” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 134). As Ashwin and Clarke highlight, in Russia, social 
partnership is used to refer not just to the network of negotiations and agreements which have 
developed in post-communist Russia but to a particular “ideology aimed at social peace and 
harmony” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 134-135). The key distinguishing feature (and that 
which makes it appear different from past Soviet practice) is that it is supposed to be based 
on equality of rights of the social partners – “neither government nor employers should be 
able to dictate the terms and conditions of labor, but should conclude agreements with the 
full participation of trade unions.” In exchange, the trade unions “offer the other social 
partners social peace” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 135).
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In practice, however, this focus on “social peace” has meant that social partnership is 
primarily understood in Russia as a method of conflict avoidance rather than as the social 
dialogue envisioned by the ILO and countries such as Germany and Sweden, where social 
partnership is a cornerstone of state-labor relations. Indeed, in his February 2000 report to the 
meeting of the General Council attended by current Russian President Vladimir Putin, FNPR 
leader Mikhail Shmakov stated that “trade unions consider a strike to be a ‘failure’ of social 
partnership. Either social partnership or class struggle (original emphasis; Ashwin and 
Clarke, 2003: 135). As another leading FNPR activist put it, “social partnership is our main 
method and form of work. To move from confrontation to negotiation. The process of 
negotiation is the basis of our activity … to transform all conflictual situations into 
negotiations, to sit around the table and come to an agreement” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 
135).
The use of social partnership in Russia, then, is a particular adaptation of the ILO and 
other international organizations’ idea of social dialogue. Rather than encouraging dialogue, 
“full equality of rights” among social “partners” has translated in the Russian context to a 
weak labor force instead of a politically empowered one. This is even more apparent when 
one looks at the actual activity of the RTK.
As mentioned above, the RTK was established by former President Yeltsin in early 
1991 in an attempt to appease the Western governments and international organizations from 
which he expected political and monetary support. Of the fourteen seats allotted for trade 
unions, the FNPR, the successor to the communist-era trade union, received nine. Three 
independent unions, Sotsprof, the Independent Miners’ Union (NPG), and the Independent 
Union of Civil Aviation Pilots each received three, one and one seats respectively. 
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In theory, and according to the above-mentioned ILO understanding of the notion of 
social partnership, the RTK should have fostered an environment of conciliation and 
partnership between labor and the state. But ultimately in both design and execution, the 
RTK has served as a “means of neutralizing workers’ organizations” and has undermined any 
hopes of political representation for workers (Clarke, 1993: 185). Western notions of social 
partnership took years to develop, and the necessary prerequisites for it to work properly in 
the Russian context were missing. Social partnership “assumes the presence of broadly 
organized, acknowledgedly legitimate labor unions,” but such labor unions are not available 
in Russia (Cook, 1997: 58). The FNPR, while numerically the largest trade union and the one 
with the most property and resources because of its connection to the communist past, is also 
the least legitimate trade union as a result. By contrast, the independent unions are the most 
legitimate trade unions (having arose from the strikes of 1989 and 1991), but are resource-
poor. While the FNPR wants to retain its primary role as distributor of those resources, the 
independent unions look to the commission as a means to challenge the FNPR’s dominance 
(Clarke, 1993: 183). Already in conflict upon entering into the RTK, then, by allotting the 
majority of labor’s seats to the FNPR Yeltsin assured that the unions would remain so. The 
unequal allocation of seats serves to legitimize the least legitimate of the trade unions, and 
given their lack of resources and small size at the national level, the independent unions 
cannot challenge that distribution. This has all served to undermine the effectiveness of the 
commission and guarantees that the RTK will never be truly representative of workers’ 
interests.
The overall weakness of the rule of law in Russia has made the development of this 
institution equally problematic, as those in authority “often feel little obligation to comply 
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with the law” (Cook, 1997: 5). In the particular case of labor, the government has often 
reneged on or ignored the agreements that it has made with trade unions. There have been 
frequent charges of bad faith, as the government representatives have often skipped meetings 
or circumvented the trade unions when preparing legislation. If agreements are reached, they 
are often incredibly vague and outline few concrete responsibilities (Cook, 1997: 5 and 
Javeline, 2003: 190). This has left much room for violation and confusion, which is only 
compounded by the fact that the agreements lack “any effective enforcement mechanisms” 
(Christensen, 1999: 123). Clearly then, the Tripartite Commission has not served as an 
effective “social partnership” for labor relations. It is restrictive in its representation and 
recalcitrant in its duties, thereby undermining its ability to serve as a voice for labor. Thus, 
labor remains a weak political force in Russia.
Certainly there are additional explanations for why labor is weak in Russia besides 
the application of a “one size fits all,” globally inspired model of social partnership. To begin 
with, the labor laws that Yeltsin instituted in the early 1990s also helped to undermine labor’s 
political opportunities. The first of these laws, “On Professional Unions, Their Rights and 
Guarantees of their Activities” outlined the right to establish trade unions. It stated that 
enterprises must facilitate the formation of trade unions and protected trade union leadership 
from retaliatory tactics by management (Cook, 1997: 35). In practice, however, violations of 
this law are rampant. Management often harasses those workers looking to establish trade 
unions and even attempts to obstruct their creation by delaying the union formation process. 
If a union does become established, management often reacts by transferring or dismissing 
leaders of the union, or denying the union benefits and resources (Cook, 1997: 35).
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The two other labor laws instituted in 1991 and 1992 are “On Collective Contracts 
and Agreements” and “On the Procedure for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes.” “On 
Collective Contracts and Agreements” outlined the procedures for concluding collective 
labor contracts at enterprises. Trade unions have the right to initiate contract talks and 
management must listen to their demands. If a new contract is established, there are fines if 
either management or workers violate its provisions (Cook, 1997: 37). Once again, however, 
abuses of this law have been frequent. By threatening to withhold wages and other delaying 
strategies, management provides a powerful disincentive to workers who seek contract 
negotiations (Christensen, 1999: 128). In enterprises with multiple trade unions, the law 
mandates that unions work together to draft a joint agreement to present to management. 
Given the trade union conflicts discussed earlier this is an unworkable requirement, and 
management has exploited that reality by playing the unions off one another (Christensen, 
1999: 128).
The third labor law enshrined the right to strike, but in a much more restricted sense. 
The procedures for calling strikes are lengthy and complicated, creating confusion and 
uncertainty. In addition, there are limits on strikes in particular sectors of the economy based 
on a vaguely defined notion of “public safety.” The law states that “strikes are illegal for 
members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, for law enforcement agencies, and 
for the Federal Security Service if this creates a threat to the defense of the country or the 
security of the government” (Christensen, 1999: 129). Obviously, this leaves much room for 
interpretation and theoretically could allow the Russian government to “declare illegal any 
strike that it deemed to be against the national interest” (Christensen, 1999: 129).
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Stephen Crowley also offers several reasons for labor weakness in post-communist 
Russia. As he notes, given the above-mentioned lack of political opportunities for labor, most 
workers are engaging in “individual-level ‘exit’ strategies rather than using collective ‘voice’ 
to improve their well-being (Crowley, 2001: 201). Though there certainly are strikes in 
Russia, when broken down by sector it is evident that very few strikes occur in any industry 
other than coal mining. This seems to suggest that workers feel that they can have little 
impact politically, and indeed “labor as an organized interest is practically nonexistent in 
Russian society (Crowley, 2001: 202).8
Crowley also points to the fact that trade unions remain doubly dependent on both 
management and the state as a cause for labor weakness. As will be discussed at greater 
length in subsequent chapters, at the enterprise level managers in many cases remain trade 
union members, as they were in the communist era (Crowley, 2001: 207). So too, unions 
“continue to serve as the distributors of social services and in-kind benefits, which were once 
funded by the state and now, if they exist at all, are provided by management” (Crowley, 
2001: 207). At the national level, as mentioned, the FNPR remains dependent on the state –
“while social insurance is supposed to be administrated by a government agency, a large part 
by default is still distributed by the FNPR … the Russian government has used this 
dependence successfully to keep the FNPR in line” (Crowley, 2001: 207-208).
 The end result of this dual dependence on management and the state is that trade 
unions remain ineffectual in pressing demands against management or the state and “given 
the long and continued legacy of [unions] being an arm of management for the provision of 
8
 The lack of strikes in Russia can also be a result of workers’ weak position in the labor market since 1991. As 
Crowley puts it, “how to strike when there is no work?”(Crowley, 2001: 202). This will be explained in the 
following chapter on economics.
61
goods and services, workers do not look to them to defend their rights” (Crowley, 2001: 
207).
Finally, Crowley finds that even if workers wanted to organize politically they would 
not have the necessary framing mechanisms around which to do so. Since class and 
specifically workers were the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union, when it collapsed 
so to did class as an organizing principle (Crowley, 2001: 211-213). Even though workers 
continue to face a “class predicament” -- with falling incomes, unemployment and massive 
wage arrears -- because of its association with the communist past appeals made on a class 
basis have been greatly discredited (Crowley, 1997: 189). 9 The problem that this creates for 
workers’ ability to politically organize is compounded by the fact that any kind of socialism 
has also been de-legitimized – even the idea of “social democracy.” With class and socialism 
off the agenda then, the framing mechanisms available for workers have been greatly 
reduced. It is a true “crisis of ideas,” and workers and their trade unions are left with nothing 
to offer as an alternative, unifying ideology (Liesman, 1997: 5). This, ominously, leaves 
workers open to the “appeals of authoritarian populism and nationalism,” which could 
challenge hopes for democratic consolidation in Russia (Weir, 2001: 6).
In the end, then, while globalization provided the initial model around which the 
Polish and Russian governments organized labor relations after communism’s collapse, how 
the model actually played out in practice politically was a result of each country’s specific 
history of labor relations during communism as well as their understanding of the global 
political and ideological norms. At the same time, however, while Crowley and Ost claim 
that:
9
 Once again, the specifics of this “class crisis” will be discussed in the following chapter.
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One might still argue that labor appears weak and its response is so limited 
[in Poland and Russia] not because of factors unique to post-communist 
societies but because of [globalization] … the point is not so much that 
labor has been weakened since 1989/1991 (it is difficult, after all, to say 
that a movement without the right of independent political representation 
was strong), but that it has been created a weak actor. Thus, unions [and 
labor more generally] in Eastern Europe confront the new global economy 
not from an initial position of strength but of weakness (Crowley and Ost, 
2001: 228).
In reality, labor weakness in Poland and Russia is a result of globalization. As mentioned
earlier in the section on Poland, the global ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism structured 
labor’s (non-participation) in the political sphere in both  countries. The idea that workers 
have been created weak is simultaneously a political, economic and social issue, which 
globalization has clearly reinforced. Ultimately, the impact of globalization on workers 
political points to the fact that “globalization is, in short, a political ideology as much as a 
social phenomenon” (emphasis added, Munck, 2002: 55).
Overall, and as a result of this political orientation, workers in Poland and Russia 
have been unable to shape the conditions of their work or public policy in accord with their 
interests. This is particularly distressing given how global economic forces have influenced 
workers’ opportunities for employment and transformed the labor market. These issues are 
explored in the next chapter.
Chapter IV
 “Cathedrals in the Desert?”: Economic Globalization and Workers in 
Post-Communist Poland and Russia
63
As mentioned in the introduction, neoclassical ideas and a belief in the restorative 
power of the free market underpinned Central and Eastern Europe’s reintegration into the 
globalized system. Dependent on investment capital and other support from international 
lending institutions like the IMF and the EBRD to modernize, the Polish and Russian 
governments adopted the “shock therapy” of neo-liberal economic reform that such 
institutions advised. Leaders in the two countries worked to establish minimal official
regulation, abolish state-imposed limitations on the movement of money, goods, capital and 
services and remove state controls on prices, wages and foreign exchange rates. They also 
began to reduce state ownership of productive assets as well as the state provision of welfare 
guarantees (Scholte, 2000: 34-35). Once these goals were achieved, it was believed that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) would increase in the two countries, bringing with it new 
technology and the business practices associated with modern, capitalist economies.
This chapter will illustrate that the impact of these policies on workers in Poland and 
Russia has been largely “distributive” and primarily negative (Held, et. al., 2001: 19). The 
economic policies followed in the two countries have reconfigured the power and wealth of 
workers in such a way that their sense of job security has decreased and wages have dropped 
precipitously. In both countries globalization has produced new forms of enterprise 
ownership over which workers have had little influence. It also encouraged privatization 
strategies that actively sought to marginalize the role of workers in enterprises. In Poland, 
however, these policies simultaneously changed the external environment in which Polish 
enterprises operated and the internal relationship between workers, management and trade 
unions within individual enterprises. In Russia, by contrast, while these policies also 
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significantly altered enterprises’ external environment, they had little impact on their internal 
organization.
Poland
As should be clear from chapter two, Poland began a process of closer integration 
into the global economy long before 1989. It did so, however, just as “the character of the 
world economy was changing, giving an increasingly privileged position to transnational 
corporations (TNCs). The interplay of all these forces [of change] would effectively 
determine the pattern of the new form of capitalist development that Poland was 
undertaking.” Indeed, with the help of two specific twin forces – FDI and privatization –
TNCs are driving the restructuring process in Poland in such a way that, as in the political 
sphere, workers are increasingly disempowered and marginalized (Hardy and Rainnie: 1996, 
247, Swain and Hardy, 1998: 587 and Hardy, 1998: 640-641).
To understand how Poland’s economic reintegration into the global system has been 
shaped by the activity of TNCs, requires first of all an understanding of how the global 
economy has changed in recent years. As Hardy and Rainnie indicate, patterns of 
international economic integration were traditionally determined by patterns of trade. The 
1950s and 1960s saw a huge increase in world trade, and economies were “locked in via this 
shallow integration. In addition, integrated international production by TNCs grew in 
importance, with its structure determined by the pattern of FDI” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 
97 and Selowsky, 2002: 248-250).
More recently there has been an explosion of FDI and the number of TNCs and their 
foreign affiliates have expanded enormously: 
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Transnational corporations are a powerful force binding national 
economies together through complex corporate strategies and intricate 
network structures, engaging in international production characterized by 
a sophisticated inter and intra firm division of labor. As a result one-third 
of the world’s private sector productive assets are under the common 
governance of TNCs (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 97).
This rapid increase of TNCs and FDI throughout the world has also been accompanied by a 
move away from investing in resource-based manufacturing towards services and 
technology-intensive manufacturing (Hardy and Rainine, 1996. This suggests, as Hardy and 
Rainnie point out, “a decline in the importance of resource-intensive, low cost and low skill 
activities as primary attractors of TNCs” (Hardy and Rainine, 1996: 98).
There are several reasons why FDI has become one of the most common ways in 
which TNCs are drawing economies together. To begin with, there is a strong belief that at 
the micro-level FDI will introduce technological and management expertise in economies 
where productive processes and capital equipment are outdated (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 
112). According to this view, “it follows that the diffusion of technology and know how will 
stimulate competition and increased integration into the global economy” (Hardy and 
Rainnie, 1996: 112). On the investors’ side, the primary motive for increasing FDI is to 
acquire a local market share and establish access to regional markets, as well as to maintain 
market power and product domination as part of global competition (Hardy and Rainnie, 
1996: 110, Selowsky, 2002: 252, and Steves, 2001: 348-351).
It is for these reasons that, following the collapse of communism in Poland, Polish 
leaders and their outside neo-liberal advisors focused on creating the political, economic and 
social environment that they thought would be conducive to TNCs and FDI. Initially, there 
was much optimism regarding the level of FDI in Poland. The number of registered joint 
ventures increased from 1685 in 1990 to 6187 by early 1993 and by 1994 the level of 
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investment in Poland amounted to 2.2. billion U.S. dollars. So too, the arrival of international 
firms such as ABB, Alcatel, AT&T, Coca Cola, Gerber, IKEA, Siemens, Fiat, Thomson and 
Unilever seemed to signal that Poland was on the road to economic prosperity (Hardy and 
Rainnie, 1996: 101-102 and Kolodko, 2002: 60).
And yet, this picture of FDI in Poland is misleading. Flows of FDI to Central and 
Eastern Europe in general have been much less than anticipated, but relative to other 
countries, Poland’s record has been particularly disappointing since it has received only 
sixteen percent of the total FDI in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, in certain instances 
the apparent growth in FDI only reflects the accumulation of FDI from the early 1970s rather 
than new investment (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 103). For example, as Hardy and Rainnie 
highlight, ABB and Philip Morris have been in producing in Poland since the 1970s; Fiat
since the 1950s (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 104).
Perhaps most significantly, after examining the relative weight of individual projects 
Hardy and Rainnie find that FDI in Poland is characterized by: 
a small number of large investments by transnational corporations, 
surrounded by a large number of much smaller investments, often 
contributing insignificant sums. For example, of the 197 major foreign 
investors, recorded by the Polish state agency for foreign investment 
(PAIZ) in 1994, 107 investors (54 percent) contributed only 5 million U.S. 
dollars or less … later figures [also] show a marked change in the balance 
of FDI, with electronics (this includes investment by Fiat) ranking highest 
followed by food processing, finance, building, chemicals, paper, 
telecommunications and trade. Finally, it should be noted that large 
sections of the economy had received little or no foreign investment, in 
particular heavy industry (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 104).
The true picture of FDI in Poland, therefore, is one in which certain industries remain 
virtually untouched by FDI, while others are dominated by large TNCs. As the above makes 
clear, it is only in industries such as telecommunications and food processing that the 
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proposed benefits of FDI (e.g. upgrading of production processes and technology transfer) 
are being realized. In other instances, such as in the manufacturing or textile industries, 
TNCs and FDI are having little impact. The location of the chosen industries also influences 
the decisions of TNCs, with the vast majority of FDI flowing into large cities like Warsaw, 
Krakow or Poznan. These facts underscore the earlier point that the impact of Poland’s 
restructuring drive is highly differentiated and uneven.
Thus, the central question of how Poland is being reintegrated into the global 
economy is at least partially answered by this discussion of TNCs and FDI: Poland is being 
reincorporated into the global system, but in a very specific and ultimately limited way. In 
effect, TNCs are like “cathedrals in the desert,” their FDI providing “development in a 
sector, industry or region but not necessarily development of that sector, industry or region 
(emphasis added, Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 114).
Having outlined the activity of TNCs in Poland, what kind of impact are these 
“cathedrals in the desert” having on workers there? As Hardy and Rainnie stress, the effects 
that TNCs have on a particular country are not determined solely by the state (i.e. legislation 
concerning foreign ownership, antimonopoly laws, etc.) but also by workers because a 
particular privatization plan cannot go forward without the approval of those workers’ 
councils that are still operating in most Polish enterprises. How then, has the unique pattern 
of FDI in Poland changed the economic well-being of its workers – at the macro and micro-
levels?
In general, at the macro-level, the TNC-driven transformation of the Polish 
communist-era command economy to one based on global free market principles has had a 
considerable, negative impact on blue-collar workers in Poland. Though shock therapy and 
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the (albeit low) flow of FDI into the country did lower inflation and foster a rapid increase in 
GDP and privatization, it radically changed Polish workers’ sense of job and economic 
security. To begin with, the dismantling of Poland’s trade relations with the former Soviet 
Union and reorientation toward trade with the West has had a disastrous effect on Poland’s 
industrial output and thus on workers’ real earnings. According to Boer-Ashworth, the 
fragmentation of Comecon 10 alone, “accounted for one-third of Poland’s decline in industrial 
output in the post-1989 period … Poland’s industrial output dropped by seventeen percent 
which also explains the twenty-two percent drop in real earnings” (Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 
90).
To receive the loans needed to transform the Polish economy, the IMF also insisted 
that Poland develop an export-driven market, which has meant that Polish products now 
compete abroad with much more sophisticated products from Western Europe and the United 
States. At the same time, the Polish domestic market has been flooded with Western 
products. All of this, coupled with a huge migratory influx of foreign workers from 
neighboring countries (particularly from the former Soviet Union), has just put more 
downward pressure on workers’ wages and further undercut the state’s ability to provide 
social safety nets for its citizens (Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 93, Iglicka, 2000: 123, and The 
World Bank, 2002: 12-13).
At those enterprises still owned by the state, the phenomenon of underemployment 
has also increased as a result of competition from TNCs. Underemployment means that 
Polish workers are officially employed by an enterprise but receive no wages or are sent on 
indefinite administrative leave. The difficulty of finding jobs and the high costs of job 
10
 This was the major trading bloc between the USSR and its bloc countries during communism.
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relocation, in turn, make staying on administrative leave a more attractive choice for workers, 
even though it ties them to a particular enterprise and limits their chance for better wages.
At the micro-level, it is important to emphasize that because the process of Poland’s 
reintegration into the global economy is differentiated and uneven workers in some sectors 
and some firms have enjoyed positive benefits from TNCs and FDI. Nonetheless, there are 
fewer examples of FDI actually improving the employment, working conditions or living 
standards of workers (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 116-117). To begin with, one of the major 
reasons that union membership is declining in Poland is that much FDI and many small and 
medium- sized enterprises are against the formation of unions (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 80).
Moreover, workers’ attitudes toward FDI have gone from being slightly apprehensive 
to outright hostile because in simply “adapting to local conditions rather than bringing in 
superior forms of employment,” FDI is undermining employment security and lowering 
workers’ standard of living (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 117). This attitude is hardened by “a 
strong nationalistic streak wishing to see strategically important industries remain under 
Polish control” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 117). At the same time, however, there is a 
realization among workers that there can be advantages to having a foreign investor (i.e. to 
procure the capital necessary for the modernization of production processes). These 
conflicting stances have produced situations like the following at the Wedel confectionary 
company, in which PepsiCo bought a forty percent share in 1991:
Workers clearly receive benefits from working for a firm with new 
facilities such as a canteen, and a social fund, which provides mortgage 
loans, other benefits. Other benefits, however, such as holiday homes, 
nurseries, kindergartens and flats, are now off the menu. The company 
clearly regards the sphere of social responsibility as being outside of its 
scope. Workers complain about a feeling of insecurity, with poor 
communications exacerbated by the winding up of the broadcasting center 
to which Solidarity had access, being replaced by a company newssheet. 
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Increased hierarchy reinforced by wage differentials has led also to poor 
relations between employees and supervisors. So while restructuring 
clearly guaranteed the future of the firm, at least in the short term, workers 
felt more insecure about their jobs. There are other reports of conflicts, not 
only around wages, conditions and social packages, but also often over the 
style of management given the long tradition of some kind of 
representation, consultation and communication (Hardy and Rainnie, 
1996: 118). 
In the end, the impact of TNCs on workers in Poland is mixed. FDI can (and has in 
certain instances) positively influence the modernization of Polish firms, but this optimism 
has to be balanced by a recognition of its impact on job security and working conditions. As 
Hardy and Rainnie find, “for workers FDI would appear to guarantee the continued existence 
of their firm, at least in the short term, but the price of ‘working closer to the world,’ that is 
being locked into global competition, has been increased intensity of working practices, 
coupled with redundancy, or at best, increased insecurity” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 120).
The other driving force behind Poland’s reintegration into the global economy has 
been privatization. While any country’s particular path of privatization is determined by a 
mixture of historical legacy and trends in the global economy, Poland has been particularly 
influenced by outside advisors and the pressures of foreign investors in its efforts to 
privatize. Indeed, the privatization program that Poland adopted (a combination of 
commercialization, mass privatization and liquidation) was based on (what were taken to be) 
successful models from the West, and in particular, Great Britain (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 
125).
According to Hardy and Rainnie, there is an assumption in most mainstream 
academic literature that privatization and competition are synonymous, that is, that 
competition will act as a spur to demonopolization and bring about improved economic 
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performance (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 130). This is not such an obvious connection, 
however, because:
it ignores the wider context and dynamic of privatization. The crux of the 
argument [against it] is that the internalization of capital driven by large 
transnational corporations has forced the pace of privatization and 
changed the shape of the public sector in all economies (Hardy and 
Rainnie, 1996: 130).
In Poland, these realities are complicated by the fact that “mobilizing private savings for 
privatization is simply not an option” there and that the conditions of the IMF and EBRD 
loans (which tend to favor private sector projects over public ones anyway) prohibit most 
state-led restructuring. Poland, therefore, is forced to rely on foreign investment for 
privatization and restructuring for a variety of reasons (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 131).
This type of TNC-driven privatization “rather than bringing about competition and 
demonopolization, opens up economies to investment by large transnational companies 
whose activities are inextricably linked to privatization. The effect of this in Central and 
Eastern Europe has been to perpetuate and in some cases strengthen [the above-mentioned] 
market domination by TNCs” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 131-132). This kind of privatization 
has been reinforced by the above-mentioned international organizations, whose stand-by 
loans and loans for infrastructure development have been inextricably linked to progress in 
privatization (Stone, 2002: 132). 
Ultimately, the interrelationship between TNCs, international organizations and 
privatization has not only:
precluded some paths and narrowly limited choices, but in some cases 
significantly affected the form of the privatization process. For example, 
while public debates about mass privatization were to the fore in Poland, 
behind the scenes the World Bank was responsible for back door 
privatization that circumvented both the Sejm (parliament) and individual 
firms … this desire to circumvent formally democratic procedures to 
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accelerate restructuring and in particular to privatize individual firms 
without the consent of the workers is an indication of the way in which 
organized labor is regarded as a problem by the state (Hardy and Rainnie, 
1996: 133).
More specifically, this link has significantly changed the structure of ownership in 
Polish enterprises. Polish workers initially thought that national investment funds accrued 
from privatization would target their own enterprises and other Polish investment banking, 
accounting and consultancy firms, but in reality: 
All of the leading bidders turned out to be foreign firms. Even the success of 
small-scale privatization was marred by the fact that although 500,000 new 
small businesses were created in 1990, 150,000 of these failed or were 
liquidated by 1992. The painful process of transformation was made more 
difficult by the tendency of transnational capital and banks to try to derive 
short-term profits from [Poland] (Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 94).
These circumstances have thus signaled a new qualitative stage for enterprise ownership in
Poland. Foreign multinationals now have direct control over the production process, and have 
been able to buy many of Poland’s strategic sectors with a minimum of capital. As Boer-
Ashworth notes, “large parts of the Polish economy have thus now ceased to be Polish” 
(Boer-Ashworth, 2000:95). While this foreign influence has increased overall investment in 
Poland by some ten to fifteen percent, it effectively means that workers have very little input 
or control over the production process in their enterprises.
What has been most troubling about the privatization process for workers in Poland is 
that it has been explicitly pursued without their input or participation. Indeed, according to 
Hardy and Rainnie, “one of the central tasks of privatization has been to strip or at least 
minimize the power of [workers] and the workers’ councils reactivated after 1989. These 
were viewed as having too much say in the fate of individual firms and slowing down the 
pace of restructuring” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 134). In fact, providing labor with a voice 
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in the privatization process was (as was the case in general politically) seen as being 
fundamentally in conflict with the goals of post -communist transformation. 11 As such, the 
privatization process in Poland actively attempted to limit the power of organized labor in 
several ways. 
Firstly, a tax-based incomes policy (the Popiwek) restricted the growth of wage funds 
in all enterprises, and after 1991, only in state-owned enterprises. The Popiwek established a 
wage norm for a given firm or sector and then taxed all wage increases above that up to 100 
percent (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 134). The result of this policy was first a “large-scale 
redistribution away from farmers and workers in favor of entrepreneurs … and secondly an 
attempt to lessen union resistance to privatization … This was meant to encourage 
privatization and to weaken labor resistance by creating the impression that privatization 
would mean higher wages” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 134). Secondly, additional 
privatization legislation required that workers’ councils be dissolved. Coupled with the 
Popiwek, this helped to strengthen managerial power at the expense of workers (Hardy and 
Rainnie, 1996: 135-137).
These moves on the part of the Polish government point to two significant facts: that 
“the question of labor and labor organization has played a fundamental role coloring the 
process and pattern of privatization” and that there has been much more government 
intervention in the process of restructuring the Polish economy along free market principles 
than the rhetoric would seem to indicate (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 137). The patterns and 
particular outcomes of privatization, then, is on the one hand driven by globalization, but on 
the other is influenced by the “particular balance of forces between state, capital and 
organized labor, contingent on the historical legacy” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 137).
11
 See Chapter III
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In sum, Poland’s reintegration into the global economy has been driven by two 
principle forces, TNC-led FDI and privatization. Aided by such organizations as the World 
Bank and the IMF, which through their conditional loans have imposed particular 
privatization and investment paths, FDI and privatization have essentially determined which 
sectors of the Polish economy will be competitive in the future. “Where FDI has arrived the 
result is that the strategic decision-making regarding the future of the unit no longer takes 
place within Polish borders. Furthermore, the survival of any particular unit may be 
determined by actions that take place far away from Poland itself, and have little to do with 
either the nature of the Polish market or the particular productive unit in question” (Hardy 
and Rainnie, 1996: 250).
Workers, in turn, have been affected by these processes in two primary ways: 
increased uncertainty of the existence of their jobs and greater inequality between various 
sectors and within individual firms. The particular way in which Poland is being incorporated 
into the global economy is, in effect: 
leading to a change from a low work intensity, mass underemployment 
system to one that will increasingly be characterized by highly intensive 
work practices. This has important implications for those both in and out 
of work … those sectors and firms that have been opened up to world 
markets, principally through FDI, have witnessed simultaneously an 
increased pressure to change, but also have acquired Western management 
tools designed to aid that adaptation. However, for the workforces 
concerned, adaptation translates into either unemployment or increased 
intensity of work (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 255-256).
Poland’s reorientation toward trade with the West has added further downward pressure on 
workers’ wages and the incidence of underemployment has increased. The growing influence 
of foreign owners in Polish enterprises has meant also that workers have minimal control 
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over the organization and production of their enterprises (Kulpinska, 2004: 2-5, Keat, 2000: 
202-203, and Keivani, Parsa and McGreal, 2001 and 2002: 11-12 and 183-186).
Russia
The process of restructuring the Russian economy has also been shaped by global 
forces, but in way that is significantly different from Poland’s. According to Sarah Ashwin 
and Simon Clarke, “the particular character of enterprise trade unionism, the ‘labor 
collective’ and enterprise paternalism in the Soviet system was not just a matter of state 
policy or management strategy but was deeply embedded in the structure of the social 
relations of the enterprise [in Russia]” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 203). Therefore, while the 
process of building a market economy in Russia and privatization changed the environment 
in which Russian enterprises had to operate, it “did not lead to any rapid or fundamental 
change in the role of trade unions within the enterprise or any immediate or rapid changes in 
the internal organization of enterprises and organizations” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 203).
As in Poland, the privatization process in Russia generated new forms of ownership 
over which workers had little input. Equally similar to the Polish case, it also undermined 
workers’ ability to organize politically. Privatization was supposed to be accomplished via 
voucher privatization, with every Russian citizen given vouchers that they could sell or use to 
buy shares in companies. To account for management and labor’s concern that their 
enterprises might be taken over by outsiders, the three forms of voucher privatization all 
provided for some level of control by the labor collective. Most enterprises, in turn, chose the 
option that allowed, by a two-thirds vote of the labor collective, for fifty-one percent of the 
shares to be purchased by the collective (Connor, 1996: 147 and Owen, 2003: 25).
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While on the surface this appears to provide workers with an opportunity to have 
some control over the running of their enterprises, privatization has ultimately been used by 
management to retain control, stifle political action and reinforce what Stephen Crowley calls 
“enterprise dependence” (Crowley, 1997: 155). As mentioned earlier, during the Soviet 
period an enterprise not only provided its workers with wages and employment, but often 
also provided services like child care, housing, pensions and healthcare. To ensure that 
workers cooperated and that they remained in control, management distributed these services 
to workers differentially -- based on personal preferences, worker seniority or informal 
connections (Cook, 1997: 30).
Privatization should have ended this dependency, but aware that with the end of state 
control their positions were no longer guaranteed, management has actually increased its 
paternalistic role (Clarke, 1999: 70). As Crowley notes, to stay in power now managers must 
“prevent collective action by workers against management or their uniting behind the 
privatization proposals of outsiders” (Crowley, 1997: 163). Management has been successful 
in achieving this goal by promising workers full employment and social services. If workers 
attempt collective action anyway, management withholds those benefits. In the face of falling 
wages and unemployment, this is an effective strategy to guarantee worker cooperation. 12
With workers dependent on enterprise management for their survival, they are much less 
likely to challenge management’s authority.
In those instances where outside owners actually did take control of enterprises 
(either by purchasing devalued shares or buying shares by tender or auction), they were 
primarily financial institutions and holding companies that “had no interest in intervening
directly in management, but only in subjecting the enterprise management to rigid financial 
12
 This will be discussed subsequently
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constraints, their profits usually deriving from their control of supplies and sales through 
their own commercial subsidiaries” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 204). 
Nonetheless, even in these foreign-owned enterprises it is important for management 
to retain control over its workers. This is primarily because the rights of private ownership 
are not seen as being unconditional in Russia and depend on the owners fulfilling “the 
traditional obligations of the enterprise director, the legitimacy of managerial prerogatives 
being regarded as conditional on management being seen to do its best to provide good 
wages, benefits and working conditions … this was particularly important where ownership 
was contested” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 204).
Ultimately, these realities lead Ashwin and Clarke to judge that privatization in and of 
itself did not radically change the “internal social structure and social relations of the post-
Soviet enterprise [in Russia]. The collapse of the Russian economy was much more 
significant than changes in ownership in determining the development of industrial relations 
and the role of the trade union” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 204). The remainder of the 
chapter will discuss this collapse and highlight its effects on the reintegration of Russia into 
the global economy.
As Ashwin and Clarke indicate, the purpose of the shock therapy reforms introduced 
in 1992 was to rapidly integrate Russia into the world economy by liberalizing prices and 
allowing them to reach world levels (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 204). Similar to the Polish 
case, the assumption was that price liberalization and financial stabilization would create a 
environment favorable to FDI and lead to a rapid influx of new technologies and capitalist 
practices. Just as in the Polish case, however, these assumptions proved to be flawed 
(Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia, 2002: 61-64). 
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Those industries that had dominated economic activity during Soviet times – military 
production and heavy industry – declined as expected (by about half in the early 1990s), but:
those industries which were supposed to flourish in the free domestic 
market – food processing, light industry and the production of consumer 
durables – collapsed as much or more, with food processing down by 
almost half, consumer durables down by about three-quarters and textiles, 
shoes and clothing down by over eighty percent between 1990 and 1995, 
with the decline accelerating again in 1996 as these industries were hit by 
foreign competition which became steadily stiffer as the exchange rate 
hardened … Although domestic production and employment recovered 
somewhat with the devaluation following the August 1998 crisis and the 
big rise in oil prices, it is not expected that the recovery will be sustained 
for long (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 205).
Even in the energy and mineral resources sectors new investment and expanding production 
did not lead to increasing exports but rather production in these branches fell by over one-
third. Overall, GDP was halved between 1990 and 1998 (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 205).
As Ashwin and Clarke indicate, the “decline of traditional industrial enterprises was 
supposed to be compensated by the expansion of the new private sector, but the growth of 
employment in the new private sector, largely confined to trade and services, by no means 
made up for the forty percent decline in employment … during the 1990s” (Ashwin and 
Clarke, 2003: 205). In addition, small business growth and the increase in employment that is 
supposed to accompany it was undercut by a decline in established facilities (Clarke and 
Kabalina, 2000: 10).
These circumstances have had a significant, negative influence on the flows of 
domestic and foreign investment in Russia. Capital investment has fallen almost eighty 
percent since 1990 and like Poland what investment has materialized has been highly uneven 
and differentiated in its impact. Many industries have seen almost no investment at all, and 
those that have, have seen only a piecemeal introduction of new technology or management 
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practices (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 206). As mentioned, “great hopes were placed in the 
regenerating powers of foreign investment, which was supposed to introduce not only 
advanced technology but also capitalist management techniques,” but between 1994 and 
1999 FDI amounted to only $3 million per annum (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 206). 
Moreover, over a quarter of all investment was in Moscow city (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 
206).
The effect of this low level of FDI is that there has been very little technology transfer 
or the establishment of new production management techniques in Russian enterprises. 
Furthermore, even in the instances where FDI did arrive:
this was often the prelude not to productive investment but to using the 
enterprise as a conduit for the export of raw materials or to simple asset 
stripping. Where productive investment did take place, expatriate 
managers might fill the senior positions but in general the foreign owner 
tried to disrupt the existing organization of production as little as possible 
and continued to work with the traditional trade union organization 
(Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 206).
With such little investment, the prosperity of an enterprise clearly depends more on its 
“legacy from the past and its external circumstances than on its ability to marshal its own 
resources” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 206). Enterprises that have relatively modern 
facilities, a significant amount of capital or access to favorable export markets thus end up 
being much more prosperous than those that have been unable to maintain their social and 
welfare infrastructure and therefore lost many of its best workers (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 
206 and Zagladin, Vadim, 2000: 5).
Ultimately, this lack of FDI and the limited growth of the private sector has meant 
that there have been few changes in the social organization of production in Russia. At the 
same time, however, these “same factors have led to a radical change in the labor market 
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situation and so the individual and collective bargaining power” of workers (Ashwin and 
Clarke, 2003: 207). Unemployment has increased to about twelve percent, but as in Poland 
an equal number of people (mostly the young and the old) have dropped out of the labor 
market entirely. Also as in Poland, other workers remain officially employed by an enterprise 
but receive no wages or are sent on indefinite administrative leave. So too, just as in Poland 
the difficulty of finding jobs and the high costs of job relocation makes staying on 
administrative leave a more attractive choice for workers, even though it ties them to a 
particular enterprise and limits their chance for better wages (Vorobyov and Zhukov, 2001: 
269).
In addition, from 1992 to 1998, average real wages for workers fell about seventy 
percent, a quarter of the population fell below the official poverty level, and unemployment 
and income disparities increased dramatically (Cook, 1997: 3). The major problem for 
Russian workers, however, has been the non-payment of wages. As of late 1998, workers 
were owed more than nine billion dollars in unpaid wages (Christensen, 1999: 132). Once 
again, just as in Poland, this wage arrears crisis and the overall downward pressure on wages 
has been exacerbated by a huge influx of foreign workers from neighboring countries (also 
primarily from the former Soviet Union) into the labor market (Clarke and Kabalina, 2000: 
1).
This transformation in the labor market has led to a “a radical shift in the balance of 
power between employer and employee, reinforcing the role of informal personal relations 
between manager and worker in the regulation of employment relations” (Ashwin and 
Clarke, 2003: 207). It has also made it increasingly “difficult for workers to sustain the 
motivation for collective action,” because management can respond to workers’ complaints 
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with a “if you don’t like it, you can leave” attitude (Crowley, 2000: 161). Thus, in Russia as 
in Poland the labor market picture is one in which “individual exit options are prevailing over 
collective voice in the response of employees to unacceptable wages and working 
conditions” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 207).
In face of the workers’ economic situation and dependency on management, trade 
unions have been unable to serve as effective representative organizations. Given the 
conflicts discussed earlier between the trade unions over resources, at the enterprise level the 
FNPR has spent much of its time attempting to curry favor with management, since 
management controls the resources the FNPR wants to continue to distribute. This increased 
dependency on management only serves to create the perception among workers that “unions 
are another arm of management” (Davis, 2001: 202).Thus, the FNPR’s already shaky 
legitimacy has been weakened further at the enterprise level. The independent unions are not 
without their problems either. The NPG, for example, had been a staunch supporter of 
Yeltsin (having helped bring him to power in 1991) and thus remained faithful to his 
government’s policies even as they produced dire economic conditions for workers. This 
created a growing rift between the leadership of the NPG and the workers they purport to 
represent, ultimately undermining the ability of the NPG to organize workers for political 
action. 13
The fact that the reforms of the early 1990s have only transformed the external 
environment in which Russian enterprises operate and not on their internal organization or 
the management of the labor force has further complicated trade unions’ relations with 
management (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 208). As Ashwin and Clarke indicate: 
13
 The NPG’s official position changed in 1997, when it broke with supporting the Yeltsin regime
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The demands of management are at once the most simple and the most 
inexorable of those the enterprise unions face. Essential managers do not 
want trouble. They want compliant trade unions that will act as mediators 
when required and will administer the diminishing social infrastructure of 
the enterprise … In general, managers have sought to preserve the internal 
unity of enterprises in order to withstand external pressures and constraints 
(Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 208).
In practice, this has meant that within enterprises unions remain at best “equivocal 
champions of workers’ interests. The trade unions take care not to mobilize workers against 
management” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 209).
The way in which FDI and privatization has changed the labor market in Russia, 
therefore, has had a significant impact on workers’ economic status and their relationship to 
management and trade unions. In the face of falling wages, exploitive management, and 
ineffective trade unions, the ability of workers to mobilize to effect change has been 
considerably damaged. It is thus not surprising that workers have remained quiescent. 14
Moreover, the structure and extent of workers’ dependency on the workplace ensures that 
they will remain quiet. Quite simply, workers just have “too much to lose” if they try to 
mount collective action (Howard, 2003: 121-122, Marsh and Gvosdev, 2002: 101, and 
Marsh, 2003: 145).
In the end, the economic impact of globalization on workers in Poland and Russia has 
been characterized by a profound transformation of the external environment in which 
enterprises in both countries operate. In terms of the internal structure of social relations and 
production in individual enterprises, however, it is only in Poland that there have been any 
significant changes. It would seem that this stems from the fact foreign ownership has been 
much greater in Poland than in Russia. While FDI and technology transfer has been equally 
low in both countries, in those sectors in Poland where foreign influence has been strong, 
14
 See Chapter III
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owners have significantly altered the product line and production processes of individual 
enterprises. It is worth mentioning again, however, that this impact is highly uneven and 
differentiated and depends on the sector and firm from which a worker comes.
Regardless of which country is highlighted, however, it is clear that the neo-liberal 
economic policies pursued as part of Poland and Russia’s drive to reintegrate into the global 
system has had a largely negative, distributive effect on the financial security of workers in 
both countries. Workers are increasingly concerned about the stability of their positions and 
troubled by the widening gap between the “haves and the have-nots.” These fears are 
exacerbated by the loss of social safety nets that the economic restructuring programs in both 
countries required. The next chapter discusses this topic.
Chapter V
Social (in)Security: Workers and Social Welfare in Post-Communist 
Poland and Russia
As was the case in the economic sphere, socially the overarching neo-liberal reform 
program adopted in both countries has driven Poland and Russia’s reintegration into the 
global system. As Scholte indicates, neo-liberal approaches to the organization of a polity 
emphasize that globalization should be “guided by market forces: public authorities should 
only facilitate and not interfere with these dynamics … neo-liberalism builds on the 
convictions of classical liberalism that market forces will bring prosperity, liberty, 
democracy and peace to the whole of mankind” (Scholte, 2000: 33). 
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In Poland and Russia, this translated into a very particular type of social policy. 
Despite the fact that the economic and political side effects of the two countries’ drive to join 
the globalized world produced significant poverty, unemployment and insecurity for many 
groups within each society, the respective governments saw these social costs as a “necessary 
sacrifice” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 63). 15 Specifically, as Hardy and Rainnie highlight in 
the Polish case, post-communist:
social policy has been driven by two considerations: the first is 
subsidiarity, meaning that the state will only provide a service where 
voluntary or private sector organizations can not be encouraged to take a 
step; secondly, the policy is aimed at providing a minimal safety net, not 
at stopping people from falling into that safety net … The provision of 
basic services in Poland has come under attack in two ways: firstly, major 
employers have begun to withdraw from the provision of non-core 
facilities such as childcare and leisure; and secondly, even though 
legislation now imposes on the local government responsibility for the 
provision of these services, it does not have the financial resources to 
provide the same level of support [as was provided during communism] 
(Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 63).
This chapter will illustrate that this social policy affected workers in Poland and Russia, as in 
the economic sphere, by redistributing their wealth and power in such a way that poverty and 
unemployment increased (i.e. to use Held’s terminology, globalization has had a 
“distributive” impact on workers in the social sphere). While the nature of this impact has 
also been highly uneven and differentiated, it nonetheless has increased the general feeling of 
insecurity among workers in both countries.
Before discussing Poland specifically, it is necessary to outline how modern, 
capitalist states conceive of social welfare because Polish and Russian leaders’ understanding 
of this conception strongly influenced their social response to workers. In the most general 
sense: 
15
 See Chapters III and IV
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social welfare refers to the material well-being of a community, or the 
material components of its members’ collective quality of life. These 
include food, clothing, housing, and health care, as well as services such 
as transportation and education, which improve access to higher living 
standards. Total welfare can thus be measured in terms of quantity and 
quality of goods and services available, as well as access to them (Sanjian, 
1999: 179).
The rise of the welfare state in turn has tended to emphasize the state’s role in allocating 
these material services, but in reality, the state has actually never been the sole provider of 
social welfare. In fact, social welfare is the “product of the interaction of four separate 
welfare sectors: the market place, the household, and private associations, in addition to the 
state” (Sanjian, 1999: 179).
In societies with market economies, the market place is the primary source of welfare 
for most people — “it is here that they acquire the means to meet their basic needs: They 
work in exchange for wages, and then change the wages for goods and services. For many 
workers labor is also exchanged for employer-provided benefits … [such as] pensions, health 
care, training … all of which directly or indirectly enhance welfare” (Sanjian, 1999: 179-
180).
The household’s contribution to social welfare rests on the “extent and variety of 
services provided within the household, usually by family members but sometimes by others 
who share a home. Services include care of children, the elderly, and the sick or disabled; 
and cooking, laundry, housekeeping and home maintenance” (Sanjian, 1999: 180). Yet, the 
household and the market are unreliable sources of welfare, for they both can “fail” people or 
exclude or restrict the participation of certain members of a society. In these instances, the 
private sector can offer additional welfare options “through its charitable organizations, 
churches and other voluntary associations” (Sanjian, 1999: 180).
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At the same time, however, the only:
potential provider with the financial and administrative capabilities for a 
broad-based [social welfare] effort is the state … though the range and 
variety of public benefits vary greatly from country to country, the state 
typically provides or subsidizes services (e.g. education, health care, child 
care) and offers cash transfers (e.g. pensions, income supplements, 
workers’ compensation) though very rarely does it directly provide goods 
such as food and clothing. It also contributes to social welfare more 
indirectly by creating or preserving conditions that allow the other three 
sources to perform their functions more effectively … (Sanjian, 1999: 
181).
Where the private sector dominates, the state can also act as the “proverbial safety net, 
protecting individuals when the web of private providers unravels or supplementing private 
contributions. This is true even in the most well-developed and extensive welfare states” 
(Sanjian, 1999: 181). 
Thus, none of these four above-mentioned sectors can guarantee a society’s social 
welfare alone. “Each has its role but also its limits” and therefore, if Poland and Russia are to 
improve the welfare of their citizens they “must not only address [their] existing benefit 
programs but promote and protect the non-state sources as well” (Sanjian, 1999: 181). As 
will become clear, this has not been the case in either country (Hoffman, 1999: 121-121).
Poland
According to Hardy and Rainnie, the trend in terms of social policy in Poland is: 
away from the collective provision of welfare benefits towards the 
individualized and atomized acquisition of such provision, based on the 
ability to purchase them. However, this process is uneven … driven by a 
budget deficit, the state has retreated to a position whereby welfare 
provision consists of little more than a low level safety net … and the state 
sees no role for itself in stopping people falling into that safety net (Hardy 
and Rainnie, 1996: 257).
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This move away from the social provision of welfare benefits has had distinct, negative 
consequences for workers in Poland.
In general, in terms of workers’ relationship with the state, the elimination of the 
previous regime of social safety nets and subsidies has had considerable negative 
ramifications on their sense of security and economic livelihood. As de Boer-Ashworth 
indicates, “basically only a third of the population can today afford a comfortable lifestyle. 
Another third survives by hard work. While the remaining one-third has been experiencing 
different levels of poverty as defined by the UN. Distressingly, the poor were financially 
better off during Stalin’s time” (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 98). The general state of health of 
Poles has also dropped since welfare provisions were reduced. Many health problems in fact 
are stressed induced (de Boer-Ashworth, 2000: 98).
Poland’s post-1989 social program, coupled with the above-mentioned economic 
changes, also led to a major increase in those who live below the poverty line. Between 1990 
and 1994, blue-collar workers’ real wages declined some twenty-two percent and the World 
Bank estimates that as a result approximately twenty percent of the population now lives
below the poverty line (Derleth, 2000: 260). The loss of food, education, housing and 
transportation subsidies, declining state intervention in the economy and continuing inflation 
have all made blue-collar workers’ standard of living deteriorate dramatically (Torres, 
Enzler, Reinecke and Romero, 2001: 25-29).
Importantly, Hardy and Rainnie find that women workers are feeling these changes 
most acutely. Women are bearing the brunt of unemployment, “but two incomes are 
absolutely necessary for a family unit, simply to provide for a minimum level of existence. 
Women, then, are being pulled into two different directions” (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 257). 
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On the one hand, there is a drive within Poland to re-establish the traditional nuclear family 
(by putting pressure on women to return to the home), but on the other hand, “as necessities 
swallow up an ever larger proportion of family incomes, there really is no choice about 
staying in work. Hanging onto a job becomes an absolute necessity” (Hardy and Rainnie, 
1996: 257). The biggest fear for Polish workers is the threat of unemployment for themselves 
or their spouses, which is compounded by the increased pressure and intensity of the work 
process itself (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996: 258 and The World Bank, 2001: 11).
Thus, the changes to workers’ relationship to the state since 1989 have undermined 
workers’ sense of stability and financial security. The loss of social safety nets from the state 
has increased unemployment and decreased workers’ economic livelihood to such an extent 
that it has increased workers’ resentment of the costs of the transformation. It has also 
decreased support for the reformist government in particular and globalization in general 
(Derleth, 2000: 261). Poland’s leaders (or their Western advisors for that matter) have never 
truly addressed this social fall-out - except to say that the “human discomfort is a [natural] 
by-product of the transition from a command to a market-driven economy” (de Boer-
Ashworth, 2000: 98). Trade unions meanwhile, given their above-mentioned problems, have 
proved ineffectual at providing a political voice for workers in the face of this social crisis.
Russia
Russia has also pursued a social policy that emphasized the retreat of state 
intervention in the provision of social welfare benefits. At the national level, this has focused 
on establishing just the barest minimum of a social safety net. Indeed, not only are 
unemployment and other social benefits “abysmally low – they have averaged about ten 
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percent of the subsistence minimum – but [not only are wages continuing to be unpaid but] 
even unemployment benefits are in arrears” (Crowley, 2000: 169).
The Russian government, like the Polish one, has in the course of market reforms 
officially transferred social assets from enterprises to local governments, “but without 
providing the funds to for them. To the extent that these social services exist at all, they are 
still paid for and administered through the workplace” (Crowley, 2000: 170). As mentioned 
above, managers continue to provide some social benefits to employees because “like the 
state they fear a social explosion … while the level and quality of the benefits provided at the 
workplace have declined significantly, they take on more importance given people’s struggle 
to escape poverty” (Crowley, 2000: 170).
It is important to mention that there have been some state responses to the 
unemployment and social welfare crises in Russia. The government has introduced 
unemployment compensation, created a nationwide employment exchange network for job 
seekers and provided some re-training programs as well (Dakin and Sanjian, 1999: 210-211; 
185-186). The new employment programs “represent only a partial response to the [social] 
dislocations, though. Thus, most benefit programs remain the responsibility of employers, 
with very negative consequences” for Russian workers (Dakin, 1999: 186). One major side 
effect has been that unemployment remains largely a female phenomenon (with women 
comprising some eighty percent of the unemployed). As Sanjian indicates, this is largely 
because most “family-oriented benefits are still assigned to mothers rather than to workers 
per se; this makes women more expensive workers than men, so that cost-cutting firms often 
target women for layoffs even though this means that their entire families lose benefits” 
(Sanjian, 1999: 186).
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The retreat of state involvement in social welfare has also reinforced the phenomenon 
of underemployment, with millions of workers going without wages for many months but 
neither quitting nor getting laid off because they need access to the benefits that come with 
employment (Dakin, 1999: 205 and The World Bank, 2003: 17-19). So too, the Soviet legacy 
of basing the welfare system on work record, or on the number of children in a family rather 
than on need has exacerbated income inequality, by “increasing most benefits with seniority 
and so income (Sanjian, 1999: 187).
The most obvious cost of this decline of social welfare for workers (and Russian 
society more generally), however, has been a considerable decline in living standards and the 
increased probability of falling into poverty. Indeed, a drastic “marginalization” of the 
population has taken place, and “the numbers of poor, vagrants, alcoholics and drug addicts 
are growing. The quality of ‘human material’ is [also] declining at a very fast pace” 
(Silverman and Yanowitch, 2000: 17-18). Social benefits such as pensions no longer provide 
adequate income to purchase basic necessities, so to make ends meet, most Russians are 
taking additional jobs to supplement their incomes (Dakin, 1999: 211).
Inflation has exacerbated all of these tendencies, significantly increasing the cost of 
basic necessities and destroying household savings. This, in turn, has prevented most 
Russians from drawing on their past savings to support themselves in the short-term. This, 
coupled with the fact that stringent government budget constraints have seen overall 
spending on social protection as a proportion of GDP decline by five percent between 1992 
and 1995, has only exacerbated the drop in living standards and increased the numbers of 
those living below the poverty line (Javeline, 2003: 180-181).
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As was the case in Poland, the negative impact of the rapidly eroding social safety net 
in Russia is particularly evident in the deterioration of the health care system. Just as in 
Poland, responsibility for health care (and other social assistance programs) has in theory 
been transferred from the central to local governments. Yet, in practice lack of funding from 
the central apparatus has circumscribed local governments’ ability to provide a wide range of 
quality social services. Since 1993, free health care has been available only to pensioners, 
war invalids and children under three, while better quality medical services are beyond the 
financial means of most families (Silverman and Yanowitch, 2000: 25 and Dakin, 1999: 
210).
Like the Polish government, then, the Russian state has for the most part pursued a 
social policy of extreme non-state intervention, which has had a detrimental impact on the 
social, financial and personal security of workers. While increasing workers’ anxiety, it has 
simultaneously decreased their support for more democratic and other reforms. It has also 
undermined workers’ ability to shape the outcome of the massive changes wrought by the 
transformation from communism. In Held, et. al’s terminology, then, globalization has had a 
direct, distributive impact on workers as well as an institutional one in the social sphere. That 
is to say, the social welfare agenda reflected the ideological dominance of neo-liberalism on 
the global stage. Obviously, the effects of this dominance has serious implications for the 
future of state-building in Russia. It also does not bode well for the future of democracy in 
the country more generally (Sanjian, 1999: 187). 16
16
 It is important to note, however, that even though this minimalist social policy was pursued primarily because 
of the two governments’ overarching drive to reintegrate into the global political and economic system, it was 
also a result of the communist legacy in both countries. The communist experience in Poland and Russia left 
both societies with a deep distrust of an activist state. Coupled with the neo-liberal orientation of most post-
communist leaders, then, this translated in practice to a reduced role for the state in the social sphere.
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In the end, what is most upsetting about the outcome of social policy in Poland and 
Russia is that it did not and does not necessarily need to be pursued in this way. As Sanjian 
indicates, the Russian and Polish states could: 
restructure the benefits system inherited from the Soviet Union, relieving 
employers of the most important programs and consigning them to the 
state. This should facilitate the distribution of scarce welfare resources on 
the basis of need and equity rather than on the economic requirements of 
the individual firms alone. It will also permit the state to play an important 
and productive role in the lives of the Russian people once again. The state 
can also enhance welfare by promoting and protecting the private sector 
(Sanjian, 1999: 196).
Ultimately, extending social opportunities for workers and the Russian people more generally 
entails much more than establishing a “free” market. It requires “an active role for 
government aimed at expanding positive freedom, that is, the capacity [for Russians] to 
participate in the new opportunities that a market system offers” (Silverman and Yanowitch, 
2000: 35-36). This would necessitate, in turn, a qualitative ideological shift away from the 
predominance of neo-liberal policies and ideas in Russia. The drive to reintegrate Poland and 
Russia into the global system, to consolidate democracy and a functioning market economy 
in both countries, does not have to come at the expense of its workers or social welfare more 
generally. Moreover, “democratization, if it is to be sustained, means that it must not” 
(Sanjian, 1999: 196).
Chapter VI: Conclusion
In the introduction to this paper two major questions were posed:
1. Is conventional wisdom that the relationship between globalization and labor is 
primarily a negative one accurate in the Polish and Russian contexts?
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2. What shape has Poland and Russia’s drive to reintegrate into the global system taken?
To these questions should be added a third, which in combining questions 1 and 2 is really 
the overarching dilemma that has informed this study: 
3. How has globalization reconfigured the relationship between workers and the outside 
world in Poland and Russia?
As should be clear now, in many respects globalization has had similar structural effects 
in Poland and Russia. In both the political and social spheres, the ideological hegemony of 
neo-liberalism in the global system conditioned how each country’s government approached 
the organization of state-society relations after communism’s collapse. These approaches, in 
turn, produced consequences for workers that were primarily negative. In Poland, political 
leaders adopted a model of trade unionism that, in ignoring the unique trade union legacies of 
the communist past, undermined the security and livelihood of the vast majority of Polish 
workers. So too in Russia, the government adopted a globally accepted model of social 
partnership that was entirely inappropriate to the Russian context given Russians’ historical 
understanding of how to address labor conflict (not to mention the overall weakness of the 
rule of law in the country).
The predominance of neo-liberalism on the global stage also significantly influenced 
workers in the social sphere. The neo-liberal supposition that the state should let market 
forces “reign” and therefore only provide the most basic of a social safety net (coupled with 
very real budget constraints), led the Polish and Russian governments to significantly scale 
back unemployment programs, subsidies and other forms of social welfare programs. This 
only exacerbated workers’ feelings of insecurity and encouraged them to turn to less formal 
channels for support (e.g. the black market, small family-owned agricultural plots, etc.). In 
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both countries, these problems were felt disproportionally by women, which as mentioned in 
the introduction, is consistent with trends throughout the world. 17
In Held’s terminology, then, the impact of globalization on workers in the political and 
social spheres was decisional and institutional. The policy choices of the Polish and Russian 
governments were highly influenced by global forces (decisional) and their organizational 
and collective agendas also reflected the choices available because of globalization (Held, et. 
al, 1999: 17). The cumulative effect, without a doubt, “embodied a transformation in the 
spatial organization of social relations and transactions” for workers in both countries (Held, 
et. al, 1999: 16).
It is in the economic sphere, however, that globalization has had the most significant, 
interesting and differentiated impact on workers in Poland and Russia. In this sphere, there 
are still general similarities in each government’s economic approach to labor (e.g. the 
implementation of shock therapy reforms). Yet, the pre-existing nature of structural relations, 
especially at the level of the individual firm, has had more of an influence on the immediate, 
day-to-day existence of workers (on the job and at home) than has the general policy 
orientation of the state.
In Poland, the twin drives of TNC-led FDI and privatization have fundamentally altered 
both the external environment in which Polish enterprises operate and the internal 
relationship between workers, management and trade unions within individual enterprises. 
Though the effect of FDI and privatization has been far from uniform, where FDI and foreign 
ownership have emerged, the survival of the firm is dependent on decisions taken far away 
from Poland itself and have little to do with the nature of the Polish market (Hardy and 
Rainnie, 1996: 250). By contrast, those firms that have attracted little FDI or still are not 
17
 See the section on labor in Chapter I
95
entirely privatized find themselves struggling to remain afloat both in terms of productivity 
and employment. They are constrained by outdated technology, business practices and labor 
organization on the shop floor.
In essence, then, TNC-led FDI and privatization are determining which sectors of the 
Polish economy (and by extension the firms within them) will be competitive in the future. 
Workers, for their part, have been directly affected by this reality (and once again in a 
primarily negative way). The unique way in which Poland is being reintegrated into the 
global economy has led to increased unemployment, increased intensity of working 
conditions and less worker control within individual enterprises. FDI and privatization have 
also added further downward pressure on workers’ wages and increased the incidence of 
underemployment.
In Russia, by contrast, even though economic restructuring policies also significantly 
altered enterprises’ external environment, they had little impact on the internal organization 
of individual firms. This stemmed primarily from the fact that the labor collective and 
enterprise paternalism in the Soviet system was “not just a matter of state policy or 
management strategy” in the Russian context but “deeply embedded in the structure of the 
social relations of enterprise” (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003: 203). Therefore, while the process 
of building a market economy in Russia certainly changed its external environment, it neither 
changed the relationship between trade unions and workers at the firm-level nor the nature of 
working conditions.
As was shown in Chapter IV, privatization undermined workers’ ability to organize on 
the shop-floor and reinforced Soviet-era enterprise paternalism and managerial control. To 
ensure workers’ acquiescence, managers in most firms are holding out the carrots of social 
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benefits (those social benefits that still exist, that is). Given the drastic social fall-out 
highlighted in Chapter V, this is an effective strategy to maintain control. Foreign influence 
has also continued to be low, which has only augmented certain managers’ position. 
The end result of this perpetuation of Soviet-era practices at the enterprise-level has been 
largely negative for the well-being of Russia’s workers. Unemployment has increased as has 
the phenomenon of underemployment, and many workers continue to go for months without 
being paid. Wages in turn have fallen about seventy percent since 1991, a quarter of the 
population has fallen below the official poverty line and income disparities have increased 
dramatically. These trends have also reinforced the role of informal personal relations 
between workers and managers on the shop-floor.
To return a final time to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter I, it is clear that 
economically globalization has had a huge impact on the organization of social relations and 
transactions for workers in particular and the societies in general of Poland and Russia. 
Globalization has changed the external environment with which enterprises in both countries 
must interact and has significantly altered the economic position of workers. At the same 
time, however, these changes only extend to the internal environment in the Polish case. In 
Russia, the pre-existing structure of social relations at the enterprise-level remains essentially 
the same.
What does this imply for understanding Poland and Russia’s drive to reintegrate into the 
global political and economic system? Fundamentally, that while the state and its policies 
remain important at the macro-level in both countries — as witnessed most clearly in the 
political and social spheres — the interaction between globalization and the nature of the pre-
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existing social structure at the micro-level are the primary movers of integration in both 
countries. This relationship also explains the differential impacts in each context.
In the end, the future of blue-collar workers in Poland and Russia — politically, 
economically and socially does not look promising. The challenge for leaders and academics 
within and outside the two countries will be to devote time to understanding how 
globalization is structuring labor relations in Poland and Russia, and then subsequently, to 
develop policies that can more directly address workers’ needs. Reintegrating Poland and 
Russia into the global system does not have to come at the expense of workers’ rights or 
well-being. Indeed, to ensure democratic stability in both countries it must not.
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